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1. ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze what influence had the unconventional monetary policy, 
introduced by the ECB, on the proprietary portfolio of the top Italian and European banks. The 
events of recent years have caused a change in the banking institutions revenues, which, 
increasingly, had to rely on income from non-interest. In particular, the factors that led to the 
change in the banks’ management with a more traditional business model will be described and 
will then be compared to the European panorama. Will performed two econometric analysis, 
one focused on the Italian scenario and the other focused on the European scenario. To do this, 
a panel dataset will be used, built by extrapolating data from individual financial statements, 
for the Italian banks, and from the "Bankscope" database for the European banks. The results 
show that some macroeconomic variables resulted to be significant for both samples, while 
other variables, related mostly to the banking dynamics, have had a different incidence, 
depending on the nature of the banking institutions and the states in which they operate.  
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2. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Central Bank is the body that is responsible to formulate and implement the 
monetary policy within the euro area. Operational since 1999, the ECB has as its main objective 
the maintenance of price stability at a level below but close to 2%. The Eurotower in addition 
to defining and implementing the Community's monetary policy must: operate on the exchange 
market; hold and manage the official foreign exchange reserves of member countries; facilitate 
the supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. In the early years 
after its establishment the ECB has been able to pursue the achievement and maintenance of 
price stability; to do what, it has made use of the instruments provided for in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), 
which we will call "conventional tools." 
Since 2007 the European Central Bank had to face a severe malfunction in the money markets 
that prevents the proper functioning of the monetary policy: the traditional transmission 
mechanisms that normally lead the economy policy impulses no longer fulfil their function, 
also in the European financial markets arose asymmetries that make unbalanced the effects of 
the measures taken. 
The ECB had to employ a series of innovative tools, called non-standard or unconventional 
measures, to restore the functioning of the transmission channels and thus give effect to its 
monetary policy decisions.  
In this thesis after having set out the role of the European Central Bank and the instruments at 
its disposal under the Treaties, I will divide the analysis into three parts, the first part is intended 
to analyse the non-conventional measures introduced by the central bank in order to restore the 
proper functioning of markets, secondly I analyse what were the results of these manoeuvres 
on the public debt of European countries and on credit default swaps with underlying European 
government bonds. Finally, I will conclude this thesis with a quantitative analysis of the effects 
of monetary policy on portfolio performance of a sample of Italian and European banks. 
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3. MONETARY POLICY OF EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
 
The European Central Bank is the central bank responsible for implementing the monetary 
policy for the European Union countries that have joined the euro, and which form the so-called 
"euro zone." 
The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) comprises, as provided by the Article 106 of 
the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), the European Central Bank and the 
national central banks of the EU member states regardless the adoption of the single currency; 
only the national banks governors of the countries belonging to '"Eurozone", however, take part 
in the decision-making and implementation process of the ECB's monetary policy. The so-
called Eurosystem is in fact composed by the ECB and the national central banks of the 
countries that have adopted the euro; the national central banks of the countries outside the 
"euro zone" are empowered to lead an independent national monetary policy.  
The European Central Bank is an independent, supranational body composed by three basic 
authorities: the Governing Council, the Executive Board and General Council. The Governing 
Council's primary task of the European Central Bank is to formulate the monetary policy of the 
euro area, to be implemented by the Executive Board which shall indicate to the central banks 
of the countries that adopt the single currency and the banking institutions, the manoeuvres to 
be implemented in order to ensure the proper transmission of monetary policy. 
The main purpose of European Central Bank is to keep under control the price trend by 
maintaining the purchasing power in the euro area. The ECB exercises, in fact, the control of 
inflation in '"euro area" taking care to contain, through appropriate monetary policies, the 
average rate of inflation for the year to a level below, but up to, the 2%.  
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3.1. Conventional Monetary Policy 
 
Since its establishment until the beginning of 2007, the ECB in order to reach the achievement 
and maintenance of price stability has used the tools at its disposal provided by "treaties." These 
instruments can be divided into: 
§ Open market operations (OMA) 
§ Require to credit institution to hold minimum reserves on account with ECB 
§ Operations of standing facilities 
 
3.1.1. Open Market Operation 
 
They are the most important tools, and are intended to influence interest rates, the liquidity of 
the money market and finally report the performance of monetary policy; with these operations, 
the ECB aims to ensure the smooth functioning of the money market and to help banks to meet 
their liquidity needs in a smooth manner. 
Open market operations can be divided into four categories: 
1. Main refinancing operations: MROs are liquidity-providing operations that are 
conducted regularly on a weekly basis. They generally have a maturity of one week. 
(before March 2004, the maturity of the MROs was 2 weeks). The maturity of the MROs 
and LTROs1 may also vary occasionally, depending on, inter alia, bank holidays in 
Member States. From the beginning of 1999 to June 2000 the Eurosystem conducted its 
MROs as fixed rate tenders. All counterparties fulfilling general eligibility criteria may 
participate in these operations. In principle, all credit institutions located in the euro area 
are potentially eligible counterparties of the Eurosystem. From 27th June 2000, the MROs 
were conducted as variable rate tenders with a minimum bid rate using a multiple rate 
procedure. Starting from the operation settled on 15 October 2008, the MROs were 
conducted as fixed rate tenders with full allotment.  
 
                                                            
1 Long Term Refinancig Operation, in the next section are explained in detail. 
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Graph 1 – Source: Personal elaboration on ECB data 
Since the October 2008 the MRO rate was lowered regularly, in order to inject more 
money into the banking system and facilitate access to credit for financial institutions. 
On March 10th 2016 the ECB took the historic decision to bring to 0% the MRO interest 
rate, so no more interest should be paid to the Central Bank. 
 
2. Long-term refinancing operations: LTROs are refinancing operations with a monthly 
frequency and normally a quarterly basis, with a 3-month maturity. The ECB may also 
conducts additional LTROs which can have other maturities (e.g. a maintenance period 
of 6 months or 12 months). In 2011, the ECB introduced the first LTROs with maturity 
36 months. These operations are aimed at providing longer-term liquidity to the banking 
system. This is deemed useful in order to prevent all the liquidity in the money market 
from having to be rolled over each week and to give counterparties access to longer-
term refinancing. In order not to blur the signal arising from the ECB’s the MROs and 
the LTROs are normally executed in the form of pure variable rate tenders with 
preannounced allotment volumes. 
 
3. Fine-tuning operations: "fine tuning", are open market operations on an ad hoc basis, 
which are not conducted on a regular basis and they aim to smooth the effects of 
unexpected liquidity imbalances on interest rates; the frequency and maturity of such 
operations are not standardised. They are aimed at managing the liquidity situation in 
the money market and steering interest rates, in particular in order to smooth the effects 
on interest rates of unexpected liquidity fluctuations in the market. FTOs can also be 
executed through bilateral procedures, where the Eurosystem conducts a transaction 
with a limited number of counterparties without a tender (in order to facilitate access 
0,00 
0,50 
1,00 
1,50 
2,00 
2,50 
3,00 
3,50 
4,00 
4,50 
5,00 
MROs
 10 
during the financial crisis, the list of counterparties eligible for FTOs was extended, 
increasing from around 140 to around 2,000 eligible counterparties). 
 
4. Structural operations: these operations are implemented when the ECB wishes to 
adjust the structural position of the Eurosystem liquidity in the financial sector, i.e. the 
amount of liquidity in the market over the longer term. In principle, structural operations 
can be liquidity-providing or liquidity-absorbing and their frequency can be regular or 
non-regular. Structural operations in the form of reverse transactions and the issuance 
of debt instruments are normally carried out through standard tenders. Structural 
operations in the form of outright transactions are normally executed through bilateral 
procedures.  
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3.1.2. Minimum reserves required 
 
Euro area banks are required to hold a certain amount of funds as reserves in their current 
accounts at their national central bank. These are called minimum reserves. A bank’s minimum 
reserve requirement is set for six-week periods called maintenance periods. The level is 
calculated on the basis of the bank’s balance sheet prior to the start of the maintenance period. 
Banks have to make sure that they meet the minimum reserve requirement on average over the 
maintenance period. So, they do not have to hold the total sum in their current accounts at the 
central bank on a daily basis. This functions like a valve, allowing banks to react to short-term 
changes in the money markets, where banks lend to each other, by adding or withdrawing funds 
from their reserves at the central bank. This helps to stabilise the interest rate banks charge each 
other for short-term funds. Until January 2012, banks had to hold a minimum of 2% of certain 
liabilities, mainly customers’ deposits, at their national central bank. Since then, this ratio has 
been lowered to 1%. The total reserve requirements for euro area banks stand at around 113 
billion euro (beginning of 2016). Credit institutions’ holdings of required reserves are 
remunerated. The remuneration corresponds to the average, over the maintenance period, of the 
“marginal rate of allotment” (weighted according to the number of calendar days) of the MROs.  
The objectives of the minimum reserve requirement are two in principle: 
1. Stabilisation of money market interest rates 
2. Creation or enlargement of a structural liquidity shortage 
Stabilisation of money market interest rates. This function is performed by the averaging 
provision: it allows credit institutions to smooth out daily liquidity fluctuations (e.g. those 
arising from fluctuations in the demand for banknotes), since transitory reserve imbalances can 
be offset by opposite reserve imbalances generated within the same maintenance period. The 
averaging provision implies that institutions can profit from lending in the market and run a 
reserve deficit whenever the shortest money market rates are above those expected to prevail 
for the remainder of the maintenance period. In the opposite scenario, they can borrow in the 
market and run a reserve surplus. The averaging provision works very smoothly during the 
maintenance period. However, at the end of the period, the reserve requirement becomes 
binding and banks can no longer transfer a liquidity surplus or deficit into the future. 
Creation or enlargement of a structural liquidity shortage. The need for credit institutions 
to hold reserves with the NCBs contributes to increasing the demand for central bank credit 
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which, in turn, makes it easier for the ECB to steer money market rates through regular liquidity 
providing operations. 
3.1.3. Operations of standing facilities 
 
These operations are aimed at providing and absorbing overnight liquidity. On the basis of how 
they are used by the counterparties, they are divided into two categories: 
§ Marginal lending facility: which allows counterparties to obtain overnight liquidity 
from the national central banks against eligible assets deposited as a guarantee. 
§ Marginal deposit facility: used by counterparties to make overnight deposits with the 
national central banks. 
Marginal lending facility. Counterparties may use the marginal lending facility to obtain 
overnight liquidity from national central banks at a pre-specified interest rate against eligible 
assets. The facility is intended to satisfy counterparties’ temporary liquidity needs. 
Marginal deposit facility. Counterparties can use the deposit facility to make overnight 
deposits with national central banks. The deposits are remunerated at a pre-specified interest 
rate. Under normal circumstances, the interest rate on the facility provides a floor for the 
overnight market interest rate. The overnight deposits accepted from counterparties are 
remunerated at a fixed rate of interest. No collateral is given to the counterparty in exchange 
for the deposits. On 11th June 2014, the ECB introduced a negative deposit facility interest rate, 
applied even to average reserve holdings in excess of the minimum reserve requirements and 
other deposits held with the Eurosystem.  
 
Graph 2- Source: European Central Bank 
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The graph above shows the amount of overnight deposit at the ECB. With the outbreak of the 
financial crisis, the instrument of deposit facility has been increasingly used over time. During 
the sovereign debt crisis, it has reached the peak of overnight deposits at the ECB, 800 billions 
share, and in 2012 the average overnight deposit exceeded the 400 billions2; This spike was 
driven by a climate of tension and lack of confidence in the interbank market; banks that had 
excess liquidity rather than lend to other banks preferred to deposit it at the ECB. 
The interest rates applied to these two operations constitute the so-called "corridor" rate that is 
lower and an upper limit on the rate of the interbank money market interest. In normal 
circumstances, there is little incentive for banks to use standing facilities, as the interest rates 
applied to them are normally unfavourable when compared with market rates. In normal times, 
the EONIA has generally remained close to the rate on the MROs. This behaviour changed in 
October 2008, when the ECB adopted nonstandard measures to counter the negative effects of 
the intensification of the financial crisis. The EONIA exhibits a pattern of occasional spikes. 
This pattern is related to the ECB’s minimum reserve system. The differences between the 
standing facility interest rates and the rate on the MROs were kept unchanged between April 
1999 and October 2008 at ±1%. The width of the corridor was then temporarily narrowed to 
±0.5%, before being widened again to ±0.75%in May 2009, when the ECB decided to set the 
rate for the MROs at 1.0%. At present, the width of corridor is narrowed to ±0.25%. 
 
                                                            
2 Source: European Central Bank Monthly Bulletin, June 2012  
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Graph 3 - Source: Personal elaboration on ECB and Thomson Reuters data 
Regarding the primary task of the ECB, as it’s possible to see from the chart below, that shows 
the price trends in the euro area, from 1999 until the beginning of 2007, the achievement and 
maintenance of price stability at a level close to 2% over the medium term has been reached, 
thus the instruments provided by 'Treaties' were effective. 
 
Graph 4 - Source: Eurostat data 
While, since 2007 the situation changes and the conventional measures are no longer sufficient 
to achieve the purpose, for this reason will be introduced non-standard measures. 
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3.2. Monetary policy transmission mechanisms stop to work 
 
Since the beginning of 2007, the imbalances in the US markets following the subprime crisis, 
are reflected in financial turmoil in European markets up to result in a real financial crisis that 
mainly affected the real economy. The ECB has been deal with such turmoil that led to a 
weakening of the monetary policy transmission mechanisms, the weakening has seen its peak 
and became a real block of the interbank market in the second half of 2008 following the 
bankruptcy of US bank Lehman Brothers. Recalling that the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism is the process by which the ECB aims to influence prices throughout the euro area, 
by acting on the reference interest rate, by the time such a mechanism is hindered by disruptions 
in certain market segments, the ECB may intervene and in periods of extraordinary financial 
market tensions, can use any tool that is compatible with the Treaties and that it is essential to 
achieve the intended goals. Therefore, it may decide to tackle these tensions through non-
conventional measures, which form part of the implementation of monetary policy instruments 
at its disposal, but which by definition are of an exceptional and temporary nature. These 
measures are generally directed to the banking sector, as firms in the euro area mainly depend 
on the banks funding, rather than funding from the capital markets. Regarding the interest rates 
channel, the transmission of the Governing Council intents on monetary policy to the money 
market rates depends critically on the banks behavior and their willingness to exchange liquidity 
in the interbank market. In general, considering the minimum reserves imposed by the ECB, 
banks with excess liquidity at the end of the trading day make loans to other financial 
institutions needing funds. However, in an environment in which mutual trust between banks 
is lacking, the link between monetary policy rates and money market rates could weaken or 
even crash completely. In this case even solvent banks would have difficulty to obtain funds on 
the market because of information asymmetries on the interbank market; the various actors who 
work in such market have access to a limited set of information that prevents them from 
distinguishing solvents counterparts from the insolvent one, the interbank market become more 
"cautious"; occurs then a lack of liquidity, this is drained from the fact that banks that may 
provide liquidity do not, not relying on the possibility in turn to raise funds in case of need, thus 
they keep the liquidity that they already possess. When the supply of interbank credit is scarse 
for the difference between the market players, the situation that has arisen since the first 
tensions of 2007, the cost of interbank lending, which is the first step in the transmission 
process, increases above the level that would be consistent with the monetary policy of the 
ECB. 
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The failure of this transmission channel has made ineffective the ECB's maneuvers on interest 
rates; following the aggravation of economic conditions, the ECB lowered its key interest rates. 
Under normal circumstances these reductions would be transmitted in a relatively and evenly 
manner to households and businesses throughout the euro area, but in that period the cuts to 
rate were broadcast entirely in some countries, in others countries, the bank loans rates to the 
real economy declined only slightly or not at all, and in others countries, have in fact increased. 
Through the monetary policy transmission channels so the effectiveness of a maneuver 
diverged between different economies.  
The blocking of transmission mechanisms is served so to the central bank to justify the use of 
the new instruments. They have been developed so-called "unconventional measures", designed 
to bring back financial markets to work properly, allowing monetary policy to be transmitted 
effectively to the economy. There is no clear definition that allows a clear discrimination 
between conventional instruments and not, the differences may be subtle; Can be considered 
unconventional measures those indicated by the ECB itself as such: 
§ Fixed rate tender procedures with full allotment 
§ Expanding the list of assets eligible as collateral 
§ Longer-term liquidity Dispensing 
§ Foreign Currency Liquidity Provision 
§ Change in reserve requirement ratio 
§ Government Bonds purchase programs 
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4. THE “NEW” MONETARY POLICY OF ECB DURING THE CRISIS 
4.1. Introduction of unconventional monetary policy 
 
In 2007, a season of "reforms" of monetary policy opened, the season that is in place today. 
The crisis of 2007 has generated imbalances in European markets requiring extraordinary 
commitment by the ECB, which launched in July 2009, the Covered Bond Purchase Programme 
in support of some financial market segments that were in dysfunction. 
The 2010 is the year in which the financial crisis originated in US financial markets and 
enlarged to the EU financial markets and economy changes affecting the European public debt 
of some European countries, straining their ability to repay debt. Only thanks to the intervention 
of the ECB and the provision of highly restrictive policies on public accounts, it has been 
possible to contain the effects of this "new" crisis that Europe has had to face, called "sovereign 
debt crisis." 
In the European financial system, the government bond segment is an important element in the 
monetary policy transmission process; this is why the dysfunctions of this segment are an 
obstacle to the good functioning of the traditional measures taken by the ECB. 
The loss of value of government securities in fact struck directly in banks' balance sheets 
institutions which held them in large quantities and this, has impaired the ability of these banks 
to finance itself on the market. In front of these difficulties, the returns needed the intervention 
of the ECB to provide liquidity to the financial system, in order to replace the interbank market 
dried up again. 
The sovereign debt crisis manifested initially in Greece, following the course of months it also 
extends to other countries such as Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain; the stability of the entire 
euro area is at risk; The Italian and Spanish government bond prices fall to peak and the spread, 
between 10 years Italian and German government bonds (BTP-BUND), rears up, until to reach 
the 500-basis points threshold on November 2011. 
By now it is clear the need for intervention by the ECB that put in place, since May 2010, 
unconventional policies to restoring the proper functioning of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. We can define these instruments as a definitive purchase operations of certain debt 
securities on secondary markets. 
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In order to ensure the proper transmission of the monetary policy impulses to the economy as 
a whole and ultimately to the general level of prices, the Eurosystem may take action on debt 
securities markets of public and private issuers of euro area, by making outright purchases of 
certain activities (rather than simply accepting them as collateral).  
In May 2010 the ECB decided to introduce the Securities Markets Programme in order to ease 
tensions in some market segments that hindered the monetary policy transmission mechanism, 
i.e. the process by which the ECB aims to influence prices in the euro area by acting on the 
reference interest rates. Under this initiative, if the functioning of the transmission mechanism 
was compromised by failures in some segments and the signal inherent in the ECB rates not 
evenly was transmitted to the whole area, the European Central Bank could intervene by buying 
in the secondary market (i.e. by banks at market prices) securities which usually accepts as 
collateral. 
The last purchases in this context were made in February 2012 and the following September, 
the program ended. 
Then, in September 2012, the ECB has defined the specifications of the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) announced the previous month: 
Ø Introduction of an unlimited purchase plan in its range; 
Ø The purchases of securities didn’t place into question the integrity of the monetary base, 
or they did not involve an increase in the circulating medium; 
Ø The purchase of securities addressed bond with maturity from one to three years, leaving 
out those with six-year expiration (average Italian public debt expiration) and ten-year 
expiration; 
Ø The intervention plan provided for the beneficial country, a "macroeconomic 
stabilization" program, agreed with the ESM, i.e. compliance with a memorandum of 
reforms imposed by the European Central Bank. 
The purpose of the OMT is to preserve the proper transmission of monetary policy as well as 
its uniqueness in the whole euro area, offering a fully effective support mechanism in order to 
prevent adverse scenarios, which could potentially pose significant challenges for price stability 
in the euro area. Unlike the Securities Markets Programme, one of the necessary preconditions 
for the OMT-run is the respect of strict and effective conditions related to an appropriate 
program of structural reforms; the aim is to safeguard the primacy of the ECB's mandate of 
maintaining price stability, and to ensure that governments are always properly incentivized to 
implement the fiscal consolidation and necessary structural reforms. Another difference from 
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the previous program is that the OMT are not subject to predetermined limits and is conducted 
in the government bonds secondary markets with maturities between one and three years.  
However, both the Securities Markets Programme and the Outright Monetary Transaction 
cannot be considered monetary easing maneuvers, since the entire additional liquidity provided 
by these operations within a week is reabsorbed in the next week. Sterilization can take place 
for example by offering fixed-term deposits that banks may hold at the central bank. The net 
effect of purchases and sterilization on the overall liquidity of the interbank money market is 
therefore null. 
In the mid-2013, the sovereign debt crisis seems to have diminished in some European 
countries, but many countries of South-Europe were still in serious difficulties. It generated an 
economic gap, between the various European Union countries, which since 2013, the ECB 
decided to reduce, intensifying the unconventional policies and allowing deficit countries to 
close the gap. 
On 5th June 2014, the ECB Governing Council has decided to suspend the weekly fine-tuning 
operation aimed at re-absorbing the liquidity provided under the SMP, de facto leaving in the 
system the equivalent of 170 billion euro issued with SMP and not yet been drained. 
Technically, this represents a monetary easing action, the first since the crisis began. ECB also 
launched a combination of measures to achieve a further monetary policy easing and to support 
the process of lending to the real economy. Package includes further reductions in key ECB 
interest rates, bringing the interest rate of deposits with the ECB, for the first time in history, to 
a negative level3.  
On September 2014, the ECB launched a TLTRO4 plan (targeted LTRO), a long-term bank 
loan, this time aimed at the credit support of companies in the non-financial sector (“real 
economy”), the results of which, however, were minor than expectations. At this point, given 
the persistence of the credit crunch and the depletion of conventional monetary policy (lowering 
interest rates to zero, negative interest rate for deposits at the ECB itself), it was decided, with 
increasing consensus, a true quantitative easing program in the Eurozone. 
                                                            
3 The Marginal Lending Facility rate fixed at -0,10%, and further lowered to -0,2% then in 4th December 2015 led 
to -0,3% and finally the 10th March 2016 at -0,4% 
4 The TLTRO have a maturity of 4 years and are linked to the duty for the banks to issue loans to the real economy, 
otherwise the sums of money must be returned before the deadline 
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Meanwhile, in the second half of 2014 and in the start of 2015 there were fears for the solidity 
of some banks, especially those in the most distressed countries; Most concern are the non-
performing loans present on the bank balance sheets, which have undergone a considerable 
increase over the previous years. For this reason, on 22th January 2015, The ECB Governor 
Mario Draghi announced at the World Economic Forum that the Central Bank will purchase 
public and private debt securities as of March 2015, at first, at least until September 2016 for 
an amount of 60 billion Euros per month and in any case until the inflation rate in the Eurozone 
will come back to get closer to 2%5. 
The ECB will buy in the secondary market securities issued by governments or by the European 
institutions6. The public debt of the Member Eurozone members will be purchased in proportion 
to their shares of the ECB's share capital held by the respective national central banks, by 
allocating 92% of the relative risk on individual national institutions (which falls to 80% if also 
purchases of public debt securities of the European institutions). 
On 4th December 2015, the Board of the ECB approved the second phase of quantitative easing 
program. “QE2” consists of an extension of monetary stimulus for another six months, until 
March 20177, with the same "power" of the stimulus, 60 billion euro per month, with the 
purchase extended to securities issued by local authorities, and the rate of bank deposits at the 
ECB, already negative, fell further from -0.2 to -0.3%. 
On 10th March 2016, the ECB decided by a majority, with Germany voting against, to bring 
from 60 to 80 billion Euros of the monthly purchase amount with quantitative easing, already 
from April 2016; to extend the purchase in non-government securities, issued by private non-
banking, with more than BBB-. Furthermore ECB decided to maintain at 0% MRO interest rate, 
down further from Deposit facility rate from -0.3% to -0.4%, again in the negative area; 
unprecedented decisions in the ECB's history, with the devaluation effects on the exchange rate 
euro/dollar; regarding TLTRO starting from June 2016, the limit for lending cash to banks rose 
from 7% of some applications, planned since their inception in September 2014, to 30% of total 
lending volume resulting in budget 2016, excluding from counting mortgages in order to avoid 
dangerous housing bubble. If banks increase lending to businesses at least of 2.5% a year, they 
                                                            
5 The names of the programs are “asset-backed securities purchase programme, ABSPP”, and “covered bond 
purchase programme 3, CBPP3”. Included in the general program “Extended Asset Purchase Programme”, i.e. QE 
6 ECB Press release of 22th  January 2015  
7 With respect the first deadline set for September 2016 
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obtain cash which to be repaid in four years at a rate between 0 and interbank overnight rate, of 
unlimited amount in advance, if not by subsequent interventions. 
On 6th December 2016, the ECB Governing Council decided to extend the Quantitative Easing 
program up to December 2017, but reducing the monthly purchasing from 80 to 60 billions of 
euro. 
4.2. Unconventional monetary policy effects 
 
As explained in detail in the preceding paragraph, in the wave of the economic and financial 
crisis, the ECB has implemented some unconventional policies of different nature: from the 
purchase of government bonds to the injection of liquidity into the financial system. The 
evaluation of their effectiveness is controversial: on the one hand, these measures seem to have 
had an effect on the performance of certain financial ratios, on the other hand they have not 
been able to reverse the trend of the main economic indicators8. 
Much of the recent literature has tried to measure the macroeconomic impact of the 
programmed purchases to provide additional monetary stimulus also when, by now, the short-
term interest rates tend to zero. Generally, we accept the positive impact that these programs 
have had on the financial system and to a lesser extent, in the real economy. In fact, if on one 
hand the LTRO operations helped to improve the Eurozone monetary conditions, by injecting 
liquidity into the system and decreasing the government bonds rates indirectly, on the other 
hand the long-term refinancing operations have not significantly contributed to stimulating the 
lending to the private sector, mainly due to the behavior of the banks, more willing to deposit 
to the ECB liquidity surplus9 or invest in high-yield government bonds. However, it can be 
stated that the LTRO operations have prevented the collapse of lending system, have ensured 
the funding of banks, as well as supported the banking system and the market for government 
bonds during the liquidity crisis. Through the LTRO, the euro zone banks have got about 1,000 
billion euro from the ECB at a rate of about 1%. The two tenders with three-year maturity, 
dating December 2011 and February 2012, injected into the system an additional cash amount 
of around 523 billion. As already mentioned, one of the main objectives of the program was to 
put remedy to the impasse that had arisen in the interbank market due to the mutual trust crisis 
                                                            
8 As the HICP index, which remain still far from the 2% target. 
9 Because of to the lack of confidence in the interbank market. 
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regarding creditworthiness and liquidity of the counterparties. It has been estimated that the 
liquidity injections of the LTRO have permanently decreased the interest rates on the interbank 
market of about 70-100 basis points10. 
Regarding the operations of the Securities Markets Programme, they have had a positive effect, 
but short-lived, on the functioning of markets. The SMP provided the purchase on the secondary 
market of government bonds accepted by the ECB as collateral in the refinancing operations: 
the program was launched in May 2010 for Greece, Ireland and Portugal and has been extended 
in August 2011, to Spain and Italy. The last purchases made under the SMP date back to 
September 2012; the total amount of euro employed with this program is 218 billions of euro, 
of which 103 for the purchase of Italian government bonds. The impact of the program on the 
spreads of government bonds has been immediate and significant: during the first day of 
operation, the spread between Greek and German government bonds fell by over 400 basis 
points; at the time of reactivation in 2011, the Spanish and Italian spreads dropped by over 100 
basis points. Even the long-run effect on yields is significant and is estimated in a reduction 
between the 0.1 and 7 basis points for ten-year bond for 100 million euro of securities purchased 
(respectively, for Italy and Ireland)11. Both the Security Market Programme and the Outright 
Monetary Transaction also had a significant effect on the yields of European bonds, thanks to 
the fact that for the first time, the ECB monetary policy operations were linked to demands for 
structural reforms to the countries; this request was appreciated a lot by the markets leading to 
a reduction in the volatility of government bonds. 
In addition, there have been further effects on bond yields following the introduction of the 
Extended Asset Purchase Programme, i.e. the QE, in January of 2015; in fact, this maneuver 
was long overdue, and once announced, led to a further decline in yields on government bonds, 
particularly those Italian and Spanish. 
Concluding, we can say that the measures taken over the years by the ECB have had the effect 
of reassuring the markets, in fact, already from the announcement itself, we have seen the first 
effects on the financial markets. In particular, the SMP before, the OMT after, and finally the 
new plan of Asset Purchase Programme have encouraged a decline in volatility on government 
                                                            
10 Casiraghi et al., 2013  
11 Ghysels et al., 2014  
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bonds yields of the countries in difficulty; The effects of the unconventional monetary policy 
will be explained in detail in the section 5 of this elaborate. 
  
4.2.1. Focus - effect on real economy 
 
By definition, the ECB's monetary policy has the main purpose to maintain the level of inflation 
in a medium term at a rate less, but close to 2%; at this main purpose, some other secondary 
purposes are added, that can be reached only if the main purpose is centered, for example, the 
employment growth and a sustained economic growth. As highlighted in the preceding 
paragraph, the two financial crises have seriously undermined the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, therefore the central bank has failed to hit the main objective and in turn the 
secondary goals. The ECB has been forced to adopt new and exceptional measures to restore 
the proper functioning of the monetary policy machine; in this regard, the strategy followed by 
the ECB consisted of two phases: in the first phase the prefixed aim of the ECB was to refinance 
the Eurozone banking sector, because banks and financial institutions were the first subjects 
and the most affected by the 2007 crisis before, and by the sovereign debt crisis then; in the 
second phase the aim was to support investment and loans to non-financial sector within the 
euro-area, key elements for achieving the objectives set by the Treaties. 
Financial institutions, since the first signs of crisis, were quick to express the need for liquidity, 
as the classic refinancing channels had been compromised. The ECB then decided to undertake 
policies in order to support the banking system, considered vital cog of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. For this reason, the first maneuvers were intended to provide 
unlimited liquidity to the banking system, for example via the fixed rate tenders with full 
allotment. Even the expansion of eligible collateral and the extension of the maturity of the 
LTRO may be considered tactics designed to facilitate the banks’ refinancing. 
The "Securities Market Programme" and the "Covered Bond Purchase Programme" provided 
repurchase plans of government bonds and covered bonds, held mainly by Banks. The huge 
amount of money, were rarely transmitted to the real economy, that is, households and 
businesses in the Eurozone; very often the excess liquidity was deposited at the Central Bank 
accounts rather than being issued in the form of loans. This situation was dictated primarily by 
the need for banks to reduce their leverage and consequently to take less risk; Also, the increase 
in NPLs accounted in large part on the decision to restrict credit to the private sector. The 
environment that had been created in Europe had it guaranteed stability and reliability in 
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financial markets but did not guarantee the achievement of the ECB objectives. Until a couple 
of years ago, the Central Bank accepted this compromise in exchange for the stability of 
European markets and the achievement of the objectives set in its first phase of the exceptional 
monetary policy. 
In recent times, when the liquidity emergency was diminished and has become manageable, 
thanks to the ECB that it was able to replace the interbank market, monetary policy has taken 
the road of supporting the real economy. In particular, the loans level to the private sector 
remains very low, as well as the level of investment in the euro area; these two elements are 
considered essential for achieving the objectives of the ECB. In June 2014, the ECB launched 
the first TLTRO “Targeted Long Term Refinancing Operation”, in order to encourage the 
banking sector to issue loans to real economy. These TLTRO, re-named later TLTRO1, 
provided the possibility for banks to borrow at a rate equal to that of the main refinancing 
operations. The sums of money had to be returned after four years, provided that such payments 
were used to deliver loans real economy, otherwise the refund should have been made in 
advance. With the introduction of this maneuver begins the second phase of the ECB monetary 
policy and the Central Bank, for the first time since the start of the crisis, concretely expresses 
its willingness to support the real economy. The TLTRO1 consisting of two tranches: the first 
in September 2014 and the second in December of the same year. However, as the months 
passed, low confidence in the private sector and the need for reorganization of the banking 
sector, don’t help the process of issuing loans to real economy. The percentage change in the 
rate of loans to non-financial sector remains constant and weak around 0%. 
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In January 2015, the ECB announces the launch of the EAPP “Extended Asset Purchase 
Programme”, that is the QE, which should also support loans to non-financial sector. Since the 
launch of the first TLTRO and EAPP the monetary aggregates M1 and M3 are growing 
constantly, reaching growth rates of about 4% on an annual basis; only in the first quarter of 
2016 the monetary aggregates mark a trend decline, but remaining still at very high levels; 
Nevertheless, loans to the private sector will not grow properly, or at least are not satisfactory 
for the standards imposed by the ECB12. 
In March 2016, the ECB launches the TLTRO2 program, which was attended by 514 financial 
intermediaries for a total amount disbursed of about 400 billions. Unlike the TLTRO1 the rate 
of interest is equal to that of the main refinancing operations but can be lowered, depending on 
the level of loans granted to the real economy, up to the current level of interest rate set for the 
Deposit Facility, rate that is negative, so the banks could also obtain positive returns on capital 
borrowed from the Central Bank. 
                                                            
12 Also because of the worrying levels of NPLs and the coverage level required for them. 
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The following graph shows the trend for the loans to Non-Financial Company “NFCs” and to 
households for some selected countries and for the euro area13. It’s possible to see that the 
contraction in loans was most significant in the peripheral countries, such as Spain or Italy, 
which recorded their minimum in the 2014, just before that the new maneuvers, aimed at 
supporting the real economy, were introduced. 
 
Only Germany has recorded a steady and growing trend, with respect to loans granted to 
households, throughout the considered period (2008-2016), while for the non-financial 
company loans it’s possible to see a corresponding drop in 2010 and a slight decline in 2014, 
probably the most sensitive subjects from the crisis of 2010. The euro area in general is marking 
an upward trend but with still a strong duality inside, the peripheral countries are still struggling 
to keep up with the shooting countries such as Germany and France. 
                                                            
13 Data update at July 2016. 
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5. GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF UNCONVENTIONAL 
MONETARY POLICIES 
5.1. European sovereign Bond indices 
 
Over the past few years, the financial turmoil, unleashed in the European markets, have had 
relevant implications on government bond yields, and therefore on the “Spread” and on Credit 
Default Swaps of individual European countries. While the financial crisis of 2007 has 
impacted marginally the government bond yields and the risk of the latter, the same cannot be 
said with regard to the sovereign debt crisis broke out in 2011. In particular, the crisis of a 
sovereign debt consists of an excessive rise in interest rates on government bonds which are 
regularly put up for auction in order to finance the renewal and growth of public debt. The state 
to be able to sell their debt securities may be forced to raise the interest rate, but a high rate of 
interest rate in presence of a large amount of debt can undermine the state's ability to cope with 
the debt payment. 
In this regard the European Central Bank, from the outbreak of the crisis until today, has 
undertaken accommodative monetary policies targeted to provide liquidity to banks as well as 
also to guarantee a ceiling on yields on government bonds of European countries in greatest 
difficulty. The dynamics of the Government Bonds are closely linked to the European banks 
profitability, especially for those located in countries most affected by the crisis. 
The first turbulence in European markets born in 2009, when Greece revised upwards the 
deficit/GDP ratio from 3.7% to 12.7%; until then, the government bonds yields in the euro area, 
and the consequent risk of countries, did not cause particular concern. However, thenceforth it 
will open a period of instability and distrust especially towards the south-European countries. 
The sovereign debt crisis first hit the Greece in October 2009, then Portugal, in December of 
that year, followed by Spain, Ireland and finally Italy in the summer of 2011. Just Italy 
represents a particular situation, in fact until early summer 2011, the Italian government bonds 
have retained contained yields and desirability on the market, enough to be considered, for 
some, a "safe haven", like the bond of the strongest Eurozone countries regarding the reliability 
of the debt profile (Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and France)14. For over ten years since 
the introduction of the single currency, Italy had been able to sell at favorable rates their 
                                                            
14 Il sole 24 ore, 20 marzo 2011 
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government bonds, despite the objective differences between the economies of the member 
countries and in spite of the major difficulties encountered by Italy, prior to accession the 
Eurozone, in the distribution of government securities. 
Before the Greek crisis erupted, in spring 2011, the Italian Treasury refinanced public debt by 
placing the government bonds at auction with average costs of issuance dropped to record levels 
of 2.1%. In an auction held in mid-July, however, the government bonds with 15-year maturity 
were sold at 5.90%, the highest in the history of the single currency, while those 5 years at 
4.93%. Meanwhile in 2010 the crisis in Greece and in Portugal intensifies, so having to involve 
the ECB and the IMF in case of Greece, requiring structural reforms in exchange for monetary 
aid. This climate of tension within the Europe influenced in negative the Greek government 
bonds yields, grew at unprecedented levels. 
On 10th May 2010, the ECB announces the start of the Securities Market Programme; the 
announcement had immediately positive effects, making calm markets and lowering 
temporarily the Greek sovereign bond yields of around 400 percentage points in a single day. 
 
Graph 7 - Source: Personal elaboration on Thomson Reuters data 
Unfortunately, the benefit effects of the SMP were short, or rather, cyclical; in particular both 
following the first announcement, took place in May 2010, and the second announcement, 
which took place in November 2010, it’s possible to see that first the Bond yields come down 
in a determined manner, before recovering within a few weeks. A note to consider is that 
following the announcement of the reactivation of the SMP program in the third week of 
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November, weak were the effects on the Greek bond yields, confirming the very low confidence 
of markets and investors in the ability of Greece to exit from a situation of serious difficulty. 
Yields on government bonds of Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain continue to grow steadily 
in the following months until the summer of 2011 when Italy is added to the countries in 
difficulty, forming what in the jargon are called PIIGS countries15. 
On 8th August 2011, in front of the deterioration of the situation, with the yields on Italian 
BOND and Spanish BONOS that were growing, the ECB announced the implementation of a 
massive intervention in the bond market, resorting to the purchase of the European securities 
most exposed to sales and speculation. The intervention of the ECB (Securities Markets 
Programme), already decided on May 2010, ceased for 19 weeks, and who became more 
significant with the increase in tensions on Italian bonds, was an important change in the role 
of the institution in charge of the Eurozone monetary policy, compared to the previous belief 
that it should be left primarily to national governments the responsibility of the containment of 
internal imbalances. This intervention helped the Italian and Spanish “spread” to remain 
contained, however the crisis, especially as regards Italy intensifies over the months of October 
and November, partly due to political turmoil in the country. 
On 8th December 2011, the ECB Governing Council decides to bring the compulsory reserve 
ratio from 2% to 1%, and to launch the first Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) with 
36-months expiry. Just the LTRO have allowed banks to obtain liquidity, cash that will be used 
largely to buy government bonds, especially Italian and Spanish, by decreasing in the course of 
the following months, the differential with the German securities; in particular the IT-DE 
"spread" will decrease from approximately 550pp reached in November 2011 to 300pp of 
March 2012 month. 
                                                            
15 Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain 
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Graph 8 - Source: Personal elaboration on Thomson Reuters data 
Meanwhile, in June of that year, the Spanish banking system has gone through a period of great 
difficulty, demanding economic aid to Europe in order to recapitalize its banks. 
On 6th September 2012, the Governing Council takes two big decisions: Introduction of the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and the simultaneous conclusion of the SMP. The debt 
securities purchased under the SMP will be maintained until maturity of the same year and all 
the liquidity provided into the system will be absorbed with fixed-term deposits on a weekly 
basis. 
Unlike the SMP, a necessary condition16 for the activation of the OMT is the agreement between 
the applicant country and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)17 for the subscription of a 
new macroeconomic adjustment program or a precautionary program of financial assistance 
(Enhanced Conditions Credit Line). The Outright Monetary Transactions got major, and above 
all lasting effects than its predecessor. In particular, it's possible to distinguish the 
"announcement effect" and "presence/possibilities effect." For "announcement effect" we mean 
the effect that the announcement of this new non-conventional monetary policy has had, 
particularly on yields on government bonds of PIIGS countries. 
                                                            
16 Necessary but not sufficient, as confirmed by Draghi at the press conference on 8th November 2012 
17 The ESM was established on December 2010 and will replace the EFSF from the 1st July 2013 
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Graph 9 - Source: Personal elaboration on Thomson Reuters data 
Country	
10y	Yield	
Gov	Bond	at	
04/09/2012	
Spread	vs.	
Germany	at	
04/09/2012	
10y	Yield	
Gov.	Bond	
at	
10/09/2012	
Spread	vs.	
Germany	at	
10/09/2012	
%	on	
Spread	
Ireland	 5,921	 452	 5,643	 413	 -8,65%	
Italy	 5,67	 427	 5,178	 366,5	 -14,17%	
Portugal	 8,878	 748	 8,234	 672,1	 -10,12%	
Spain	 6,634	 523	 5,698	 418,5	 -20,04%	
Germany	 1,400	 -	 1,513	 -	 -	
Table 1 - Source: Personal elaboration on Thomson Reuters data 
As can be seen from the table and from the graph18, we had considerable “announcement effect” 
which reported confidence to the market by allowing a reduction on government bonds yields 
and in the "spread" w.r.t Germany. Despite that no State had requested the activation of this 
purchase bonds program in the 2013-2014 biennium, the government bonds yields have 
remained at significantly lower levels compared to the months before the announcement. This 
                                                            
18 In the graph and in the table, does not appear deliberately the spread between Greece and Germany as much 
affected by the instability of the country and affected only marginally by the unconventional policies. 
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situation is due to the "presence/possibility" effect, that is by the fact that all Member States 
can request, at any time, the OMT activation. Precisely because of this second "effect” that the 
cycle19 you which had with the SMP broke. Investors, in fact, know that in the event that a State 
would find itself in a situation no longer economically sustainable can require this "lifesaver" 
to the ECB, with of course determined costs, in a manner to be able to significantly improve, 
with a time horizon not too high, their situation. This "protection net" put in place by the ECB 
had, again, allowed to keep yields and "spreads" to significantly lower levels than in the past20. 
The government bond yields continued their decline during 2013 and the first half of 2014 
thanks to the lowering of interest rates by the ECB in January 2013 before, in May and in 
November 2013 after. Especially the Greek government bond yield decreased from 40% 
interest in March 2012 to 7% in March 2014, mainly thanks to the regained credibility and the 
reforms undertaken in concert with the ECB. 
 
 
Graph 10 - Source: Personal elaboration on Thomson Reuters data 
 
                                                            
19 Decline in yields in the days after the resumption of purchases, increase of the same once the ECB ceased to 
intervene in the market. 
20 Italy in March 2013 experienced a rise in yields, and consequently in the "spread" primarily due to political 
instability in the country more than the ECB maneuvers 
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The situation in Europe stabilizes and the emergency on government bonds yields seems to fall, 
although in some cases the yields remain very high and complicate the reform process 
undertaken by the states. In January of 2015 the ECB launched the "Extended Assets Purchase 
Programme" EAPP, i.e. quantitative easing; this contributes to a further decline in yields during 
2015 and 2016, also leading to a negative rate the yields on German government bonds. The 
decline in yields was most significant regarding Italy, Spain and Ireland; regarding Portugal 
yields continued to be fairly volatile, while Greece during Spring/Summer 2015 has seen an 
increase of its yields still due to the fragility of the country. 
 
Graph 11 - Source: Personal elaboration on Thomson Reuters data 
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5.2. European sovereign Credit Default Swap 
 
Born in the mid-nineties with the specific aim to act as a protection and risk management tool, 
the CDSs have reached an important level in the financial news thanks to the Greek crisis. These 
tools have become the barometer, along with spreads, of an entity reputation on the market. In 
fact, the higher the price of the CDS, the higher the risk of default. The credit default swap 
(CDS) is in effect a credit derivatives contract, is therefore a swap used to transfer the credit 
exposure of fixed income products between parties.  
The CDS is certainly the most widely used credit derivative. Technically it is an agreement 
between a buyer (called protection buyer) and a seller (protection seller) through which the 
seller agrees, in front of a premium paid by the purchaser, to make a specific payment in the 
case of a specific event called "credit event", which typically is the third-party default. Whereby 
to the protection buyer, the CDS market offers the opportunity to reduce the concentration of 
credit exposures and tied assets for regulatory capital purposes. To the protection seller, the 
CDS market allows him to take positions on a custom period, perceiving the proceeds without 
having to finance them.  
It's definitely a very evolved financial instrument but not necessarily complicated, in essence, 
the CDS is comparable to an insurance against insolvency of an issuer. This is why the CDS is 
often used as an insurance policy or coverage for the subscriber of a bond. 
Credit default swaps (CDS) on sovereign issuers account for a small share of the overall market. 
In December 2010, they weighed about 16 percent of the total gross notional value and 20 per 
cent on the net notional value of outstanding contracts; about 80 percent of the positions at the 
end of 2010 was, therefore, related to companies and private issuers. The sovereign CDS market 
has, however, registered a strong growth rate in the most recent period: in 2009 the net positions 
grew by 20 per cent and gross by 30 percent; in 2010, however, the net positions are more than 
doubled, while gross ones have grown by over 50 percent21. The development of the CDS 
market on sovereign issuers is therefore a relatively recent phenomenon, probably due to the 
growth of the hedging needs revealed by the sharp deterioration of the public finances in the 
major advanced and emerging countries. 
                                                            
21 CONSOB Discussion paper, 2011 
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The segment of CDS on sovereign issuers is very focused. In December 2010, the top 10 
sovereign reference entities accounted for about 55 percent of the notional value (both gross 
and net) of the total CDS on sovereign issuers, and 44 per cent in the number of positions. 
According to the theory, the CDS price is equal to the underlying security return less the risk-
free rate. The price is expressed in basis points, then when the price is 100b.p. it means that on 
an amount of one million Euros of Bonds, we should pay €10,000 to be protected against the 
default risk, i.e. 1% of the total. 
The CDS prices reached, for the first time, worrisome levels between 2009 and 2010. The 
January 1st 2010 in fact, the price of Greek CDS was at 270 basis points level, the Portuguese 
price stood at around 90 basis points, the Spanish ones around the 113 and the Italian stood at 
a level of 108 bp. However, is in April of 2010 who register early peaks in CDS prices, reaching 
levels of 700 basis points in the case of Greece, while the other countries mentioned above, 
attested around the 100 bp level.  
 
Graph 12 – Source: Own elaboration on Thomson Reuters data 
In May 2010, following the Greek bailout and the announcement of the Securities Market 
Programme, the prices growth slow down and the situation will calm down until November 
when prices returned to rise to high levels. Meantime, the Greek crisis drag up also the prices 
of Portugal, Spain and Italy making them to exceed 200 basis points. The announcement of the 
reactivation of the SMP, made on December 2010, had shortly effects on the CDS prices, in 
fact, initially the prices fall, before recovering within a few weeks.  
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Graph 13 – Source: Own elaboration on Thomson Reuters data 
Things get worse in July 2011, when the Greek derivative exceeds the 1500 basis points, 
reaching 2000 b.p. in September (graph 14), while the Portuguese CDS, following the internal 
crisis, suffers an escalation from January 2011 to January 2012 (graph 13); The Spanish and 
Italian CDS seem to go hand in hand throughout the course of 2011, undergoing a strong growth 
in September.  
 
Graph 14 – Source: Own elaboration on Thomson Reuters data 
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At this point throughout the course of 2012, the Greek CDS continue to rise dramatically, nor 
the announcement of the second Greek bailout and the introduction of the OMT in September 
have had effects on the CDS prices. While Portuguese, Spanish and Italians CDS began 
recording a steady decline in prices, helped also by the introduction of the OMT, up to reach 
pre-crisis levels around November 2014 
 
 
Graph 15 – Source: Own elaboration on Thomson Reuters data 
 
There is an interesting aspect to be introduced with regard to CDS prices during the Sovereign 
debt crisis. In theory, the yield on a government bond, net of the premium paid for the 
acquisition of protection must be equal to the risk-free rate, which means that the government 
bond spreads (yield - risk free rate) must be equal the price of CDS. Again, in theory, a portfolio 
consisting of a bond and of a CDS on the same bond synthetically replicates a risk-free rate. 
However, since the financial crisis, the prices of CDS on sovereign issuers have been 
systematically higher than the spreads on government bonds (so-called situation of "positive 
basis"); only in the case of Greece, there have been persistent episodes of negative base. There 
are several reasons that can explain this phenomenon linked mainly to the counterparty risk of 
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the CDS contracts, as market imperfections that impede the arbitrages and the different liquidity 
of the two markets. 
 
 
 
           Graph 16/17 – Source: CONSOB elaboration 
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6. THE DETERMINANTS OF BANKS PERFORMANCE 
6.1. Introduction to the determinants of banks performance 
 
Many are the determinant of the banks’ performances, but the two crises that occurred in the 
recent past have highlighted some determinant performance factors that worth to be analyzed. 
These factors directly affect the net profits of financial institutions and for that reason have been 
the subject of studies over the past years including by the European supervisory authorities. We 
can identify four main determinants: 
I. Interest margin (Net interest income) 
II. Non-interest income 
III. Non-performing loans 
IV. Operating costs 
These factors deserve to be explained, and to understand why they directly affect bank 
performances:  
I. Interest Margin (Net interest income)  
Regarding the net interest income, it is the most important determinant of performance for the 
banks with a classic business model, which is based mainly on the collection of savings and on 
loans to clients, therefore relying principally on interest income from loans. Literally the net 
interest income is the algebraic sum between the active interest income, i.e. mainly income 
deriving from loans, and passive interest income, i.e. mainly the interest paid by banks to the 
debtors22. The net interest income was subject of discussions in the recent years and it is closely 
related to the monetary policy decisions of the ECB; in fact in the recent years the Central Bank 
with its monetary policy has achieved a lowering of the interest rates; if on one hand it is true 
that today financial institutions are able to borrow money at zero cost from the ECB, in the 
other hand it is equally true that the rate of interest required to customers have been lowered in 
turn, causing a decrease in net interest income and as consequence a contraction in the net 
profits. If you consider that the banks to reduce their risks, have had to reduce their leverage, 
even if there would be the possibility to generate a margin, it cannot, and is not, exploited by 
banks. The weak macroenomic conditions in the South-European countries, and the consequent 
                                                            
22 Including active and passive interest from financial investment 
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contraction of loans to clients, brought the interest margin to have less and less weight in bank 
balance sheets. 
As we will see in the next few pages, the contraction in net interest income has been uneven 
within the euro area. In fact, there is a strong duality in progress; the South-European countries23 
have undergone a very significance interest margin contraction, both as a result of falling rates, 
but mostly due to the huge increase in non-performing loans on banks’ balance sheets. In fact, 
the NPL levels have a significant impact in the financial statements of banks and are caused 
mainly by the poor economic situation of the countries in difficulty. 
 
 
Graph 18 - Source: Own elaboration based on the consolidated financial statements of each bank 
 
This figure represents the Net interest income trend for the top four listed Italian banks24. As 
it’s possible to observe, the interest margin over the years has undergone a steady decline for 
the entire sample. Only two banks in the sample considered25 had increased their Net interest 
income for the period 2008-201526.  
 
                                                            
23 In Particular Italy, Spain and Greece 
24 Top four for Total Assets. 
25 The sample is available in the section 9.1 
26 Banca Desio e Brianza, Banca Popolare di Sondrio, Fineco 
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                    Table 2 - Source: Own elaboration based on Bankscope data 
 
The average decline for the sample is -26,22%, with peaks, above, or near, the 50% achieved 
in the case of Banca CARIGE, Banco di Sardegna and UBI bank27. This data confirms that 
owing to the contraction of the interest margin, banks have had to rely less on revenue from 
interest and have focused more on revenue from non-interest income.  
While, regarding the European bank situation, the overall picture is quite different; in fact, the 
general trend recorded, during the same period, is positive, with only a general downturn, for 
the majority of the sample28, for the biennium 2012-2013, and then a relevant increase in the 
2014-2015 is recorded. The only two banks, in the sample considered that recorded a huge 
contraction in the net interest income for that period are the Greek National Bank and Intesa 
San Paolo, coming to reach the 47,11% of the margin reduction for the Greek bank and 25,82% 
for the Italian one, while the Europe average stands at +21,83%. 
                                                            
27 The decline was -58,75% for CARIGE, -45,57% for UBI bank and -51,60% for Banco di Sardegna 
28 The sample is available in the section 9.b 
∆% Variation in Net interest 
income: 2008-2015 
Banca Desio e Brianza 13,98% 
Banca MPS -40,57% 
Banca Carige -58,75% 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio 13,32% 
Banca Profilo -27,30% 
Banco Di Sardegna -51,60% 
Credito Emiliano -32,09% 
Credito Valtellinese -12,81% 
Banca Popolare di Milano -24,69% 
Banco Popolare -31,46% 
BPER -8,39% 
Intesa San Paolo -25,82% 
UBI -45,57% 
Unicredit -35,39% 
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Graph 19 - Personal elaboration on Bankscope data 
In the figure the Net interest margin trend for the top five banks for total assets level are 
reported. This graph support the thesis for which banks with a less classic business model 
suffered less from the deterioration of macroeconomic condition in the EU countries;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 - Source: Own elaboration based on Bankscope data 
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YoY% 
2012 
YoY% 
2013 
Banco Santander  -2,78% -13,29% 
BNP Paribas -8,90% -10,07% 
BBVA 13,04% -8,88% 
Scociètè Gènèrale -7,93% -9,78% 
Credit Agricole -1,88% -8,29% 
KBC  -18,88% -12,52% 
Natixis -34,27% 28,04% 
Deutsche Bank -8,43% -7,14% 
Commerzbank -3,52% -5,03% 
Erste Bank -6,15% -8,51% 
Banco Sabadell 21,47% -2,98% 
Banco Popular Espanol 29,95% -10,79% 
Deutsche PostBank -7,11% -8,88% 
Credit Industriel et Commercial -30,03% 39,38% 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank -4,98% 7,91% 
Greek National Bank -12,43% -6,18% 
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The data reported in the table above, show the year on year percentage variation for the 
biennium 2012-2013; as it’s possible to see, about the entire sample suffered a contraction in 
net interest income in the concerned period, and then a huge recover in the following year. This 
scenario could be, among others, related to the Non-performing loans rate in the banks’ balance 
sheets; In fact, from a combined analysis with the data reported in the next paragraph, we can 
observe that countries with a low level of NPLs recovered quickly the contraction in interest 
margin, while the countries with a high NPLs level, as Italy and Greece, have not yet recovered 
the gap. 
II. Non-interest income 
As described earlier, in a general situation of macroeconomic difficulties with limited 
confidence in the real economy accompanied by a classic business model, banks have suffered 
a substantial decline in the net interest income; Therefore, the banking institutions in order to 
compensate for these losses and support the net profits have sought to increase the non-interest 
income, such as commissions on services, fees and income from investments in the portfolio. 
Just these two items have always had more importance, over time, within the banks' balance 
sheets, sometimes equalling the net interest income as in the case of UBI, or even assuming 
more weight as in the case of Intesa San Paolo, for the Italian scenario. In the Italian context, it 
can be said that the monetary policy of the ECB has made a significant contribution to revenues 
from the portfolio of banking institutions, in fact, the more revenues from non-interest were 
recorded following the support to sovereign government bonds by the ECB, securities which 
represent a substantial part of the banks' portfolios. 
III. Non-Performing Loans 
Another factor, probably the most important during financial crises, which influences the 
performance of banking institutions is the level of Non-performing loans in banks' balance. 
Non-performing loans are activities that are no longer able to repay the principal and interest 
owed to creditors. In practice the claims for which the collection is uncertain both in terms of 
meeting the deadline and for the exposure amount. NPL, constitute a drag on economic activity, 
especially for countries that rely mainly on bank financing, as is the case in the euro area. High 
NPL reduce profitability, increase funding costs and tie up bank capital, which negatively 
impact credit supply and ultimately growth. 
More specifically, the presence of non-performing debt on banks' balance sheets weighs on 
their ability to lend to the real economy through essentially three channels: 
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Lower profitability: NPLs imply higher provisioning needs, which in turn lower banks net 
operating income. Profits are further reduced by the increased amount of human resources 
needed to monitor and manage high NPL stock; 
Higher capital requirements: NPLs are risky assets which attract higher risk weights than 
performing loans; High NPLs tie up banks' resources and crowd out new credit;  
Higher funding costs: Investors and other banks are less willing to lend to banks with high 
NPLs levels, leading to higher funding costs for these banks and a negative impact on their 
capacity to generate profits. 
Since the start of the crisis, the distribution of NPL has been highly unequal among Member 
States, with stressed countries 29  suffering major increases in NPL ratios. At the end of 
September 2015, the two countries which had to implement strict capital controls, Greece and 
Cyprus, reported NPL ratio of more than 40%. Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Romania all report gross NPL ratio between 10% and 20%. Accounting practices 
may also differ across jurisdictions and have, to a lesser extent, some impact on the relative 
levels of NPL. 
In the EU, the average rate of non-performing loans is slowly decreasing, from 6.4% in 
December 2014 to 5.9% at the end of September 201530, however le level remains three time 
higher than in other major developed countries31. 
                                                            
29 Countries mostly hit by the crisis 
30 European Parliament, March 2016 
31 EBA Reports on NPLs, 22 July 2016 
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Figure 1 - Source: European Parliament Focus, March 2016 
 
IV. Operating Costs 
Operating costs are an important determinant of banks performances, however, they were often 
underestimated before the outbreak of the financial crises; in some countries, including Italy, 
operating costs have a negative impact on bank balance sheets, by reducing significantly the 
net profits. The phenomenon of the high operating costs, such as personnel costs and other 
operating costs, is not a recent phenomenon, but already in the 90s some studies had shown an 
inefficiency from this point of view. However, during the financial crisis, when the net interest 
margin shrank, the problem of too high costs emerged becoming a critical component of bank 
performance. 
Analysing the profitability of European banks, with a particular focus on the Italian 
environment, in the last decade, the banks’ profitability has sharply deteriorated, and despite 
the mild recovery in the most recent period, it has nowhere reverted to its pre-crisis levels32. 
                                                            
32 Albertazzi, Norapietro and Siviero 2016 
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While recent data show that the profitability gap of Italian banks vis-à-vis the rest of Europe is 
closing, it had been ample in the previous decade. The average ROE of Italian banks was 3.0 
per cent, lower than in the other countries, where it was on average 7.5 per cent. Specifically, 
banks’ ROE was 8.1 per cent in non-euro area European countries (including Swiss, British and 
Swedish intermediaries); 7.6 in the other euro area economies that have been directly hit by the 
sovereign debt crisis (henceforth: “stressed”); 6.9 per cent in non-stressed euro area countries33.  
 
ROE34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the other hand, if we consider ROA, defined as the ratio between net income and total 
assets35, as index of banks performance, the underperformance of Italian banks is mitigated;  
  
                                                            
33 Albertazzi, Norapietro and Siviero 2016. 
34  Percentage ratio of net profits (excluding non-recurring items) to total equity (common equity and reserves). 
35 The ratio usually considered in the banks’ performances analysis, as in the case of Albertazzi, Norapietro and 
Siviero, Banca d’Italia, 2016. ROA is calculated in this way, in this context, since costs (especially labor costs), 
provisions (due to the high level of NPLs) and taxes (until a few years ago on average higher than the European 
level) have a relevant impact on the banks’ profitability, they are included in the calculation in order to have a 
more accurate estimate of the management’s ability to generates profits from the available assets. 
Graph 20 - Stressed euro area countries: ES, GR, IE, IT, PT; non-stressed euro area countries: AT, BE, 
DE, FR, NL; non-euro area countries: CH, GB, SE. Weighted averages, with weights equal to total assets 
Source: Bank of Italy, 2016 
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This suggests that the leverage ratio pays a nontrivial role in explaining part of the lower ROE 
of Italian banks.  
"#$ = "#& ∗	)*)	+,,-),-./0)1   
where    )*)	+,,-),-./0)1  = Financial leverage 
The total assets-to-equity ratio is often referred to as the bank’s equity multiplier, which 
measures financial leverage. Generally, banks with lower leverage (higher equity) will report 
higher ROA, but lower ROE.  
 
ROA36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decomposing the ROA into main components, as follow  
"#& = 2-)	34*50),)*)+6	+,,-),   where  
NET PROFITS = net interest income + non-interest income – costs –provisions – tax 
It’s possible to guess how the Italian and “stressed” countries banks’ ROA diminished during 
the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. The Net interest income represents the 
major contributor to Italian banks and stressed euro area banks’ ROA, reflecting the mainly 
                                                            
36 Percentage ratio of net profits to total assets. Net of non-recurring items. 
Graph 21 - Source: Bank of Italy, 2016 
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traditional business model, based on the raising of savings and lending to real economy. 
Because of their traditional business model, Italian banks and more in general south European 
banks were relatively shielded from the impact of the global financial crisis but suffered 
relatively more from the deterioration of the macroeconomic environment, particularly 
following the sovereign debt crisis. In addition to the traditional deposit-taking and lending 
activities, banks supply a wide array of other services37. The expansion of these services 
increased markedly in the pre-crisis period, owing to financial deregulation and liberalization; 
the increase varied considerably across institutions and countries. 
  
                                                            
37 These services include: more traditional services as cash management or safety deposit boxes; investment 
service as trust accounts; insurance services, investment banking, brokerage and other non-interest services. 
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6.2. Interconnection between monetary policy and banks 
performance 
 
The shocks occurred in the last years, in first place the global financial crisis of 2007 and more 
recently the European sovereign debt crisis, have highlighted the interconnection between 
Banking sector and macroeconomy. The performances of credit institutions are mainly 
influenced by macroeconomic developments, which affect several areas of the banking activity. 
First, in several countries, including Italy, the two recessions have resulted in a great and 
unprecedented worsening of credit quality, with a substantial increase of bad debt and other 
non-performing loans (NPLs), leading a fall in the banking profits. At the same time the 
worsening in financial conditions has contributed to the fall in economic activity during the 
global financial and sovereign debt crisis. Secondly, in recent years we have witnessed a steady 
decline in the banks' profitability margin, especially for those banks with a more traditional 
business model.  
The profitability of Italian Banks, and more in general, of other South European countries, went 
under scrutiny in the last few years, because in the context of persistently weak macroeconomic 
environment, rising credit, together with the reduction in intermediated funds and the 
contraction of interest rate spreads, due, mainly by the ECB expansionary monetary policy, 
have exerted downward pressure on both bank profits and bank capital. These developments 
have in turn affected the availability of credit for real economy, exacerbating and lengthening 
the effects of the crisis 38 . Furthermore, considering the new Basel III requirements, the 
capitalization level became even more important and the ability of banks to extend credit to the 
economy heavily depends on banks performances and on the cost-efficiency level.  
Focusing on the Italian scenario, the analyses available in literature shows that the weak 
profitability of Italian banks is by no means a recent phenomenon. Already in the early 1990s, 
and for the rest of that decade, Italian banks were underperforming their competitors in other 
major advanced economies39. In particular, the differences in profitability were sizable and only 
                                                            
38 Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2004; Albertazzi and Marchetti 2011; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Sette 2012 
39 Gambacorta, Gobbi and Panetta 2001 
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partly ascribable to differences in national economic conditions, in fact Italian banks were also 
heavily disadvantaged by low-cost efficiency levels.  
 
6.2.1 Why monetary policies influence banks performance? 
 
In an environment of market instability, due to the recent European crisis, and economic 
hardship for many Eurozone countries, monetary policy plays a crucial role in supporting 
financial institutions and economies. Many were the policies that support the liquidity of 
European banks following the global crisis of 2007; Firstly, these policies were aimed at 
supplying liquidity to credit institutions and to alleviate the turmoil on financial markets; In a 
second time, during the sovereign debt crisis, monetary policy has focused mainly to support 
for government bods of Southeast European countries, significant component in the banks’ 
investment portfolio; in fact the monetary policy conducted by the ECB has the aim to support 
government Bonds and to avoid further losses on banking portfolio. In particular, the Main 
refinancing operation (MRO) "at a fixed rate and with full allotment" and Long-term 
refinancing operations have been able to make up for the dysfunction of the interbank market 
and meet the liquidity demand from the Eurozone banks, since the latter had ceased to provide 
liquidity; the unlimited supply of funds by the central bank has allowed the ECB to replace the 
money market as an intermediary between financial institutions. As a result, money market 
transactions decreased significantly, hampered by distrust on the strength of the counterparties, 
and the Eurosystem's balance sheet size has increased significantly. After the considerable 
expansion in October 2008, the Eurosystem's balance sheet has increased further in June 2009 
on the occasion of an extraordinarily high level of demand (€ 442 billion) in the first longer-
term refinancing operation (LTRO) with a maturity of one year, which allowed banks to obtain 
long-term liquidity, very precious in that period. The increase in the Eurosystem's balance sheet 
has also helped the expansion of the number of counterparties taking part in the refinancing 
operations. If before the crisis around 360 financial institutions participated on average in each 
refinancing operation, afterwards, given the limited access to interbank and securities markets, 
the number rose to more than 800 during the crisis. 
With an eye to the Italian landscape, the analysis of the literature identified several factors 
responsible for the low profitability of Italian banks; The most important elements will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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7. ANALYSIS OF THE MONETARY POLICY EFFECTS ON BANKS’ 
PORTFOLIOS PERFORMANCES 
 
The analysis that follows has the aim of studying the effects of the monetary policy of the ECB 
on banks’ portfolio performances; Usually in the literature, two profitability variables are taken 
into consideration as index of banks’ performance: the profits to assets ratio, i.e. the return on 
assets, ROA, and the profits to equity ratio, i.e. the return on equity, ROE. In principle, the 
ROA reflects the ability of a bank’s management to generate profits from the bank’s assets.  
In this analysis, another type of performance is studied, in particular, we want to focus on the 
investment portfolio performance of the majors Italian and European banks. With this analysis, 
we want to study how investment portfolio changed following the two recent crisis and after 
the decision taken by the European central bank.  
The main idea is that, banks with a more traditional business model, generally south European 
banks (including Italian banks), suffered more from the poor economic conditions in their 
countries since they recorded a fall in the net interest income and an increase in the Non-
Performing Loans. If on one hand, Italian and stressed-EU countries banks had to relatively 
change their business model increasing the non-interest income, in the other hand the Monetary 
policy conducted by the ECB in the last years had the purpose of supporting the weak 
macroeconomic conditions in the south-EU countries, giving unlimited amount of money to 
financial institutions, and to supporting financial market, especially the government bonds 
which suffered particularly during the Sovereign debt crisis.  
This following analysis is divided in two parts: the first part focuses on the Italian scenario and 
the second part focuses on the more general European scenario.  
Regarding the Italian landscape, the 14 banks listed on the Italian stock exchange40 are taken 
into consideration, while for the European analysis a group of 1741 major European banks, from 
the principal European countries, is considered. Then a quantitative analysis will be provided, 
taking into consideration different monetary policies, macroeconomic and controlling 
variables.  
                                                            
40 Excluding Mediobanca, Fineco and Banca Finnat for their particular business type. 
41 Principal european banks for capitalization. 
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7.1. Italian case 
 
As anticipated in the previous pages, the profitability of Italian banks depends on several 
factors, some related to the backing activity itself and others related to external variables as the 
macroeconomic conditions. More in general the relative performance of Italian intermediaries, 
comparatively weak in the pre-crisis years, improved during the global financial crisis, when 
the deterioration of their profitability was mild, mainly in relation to the limited losses on 
structured credit products and other toxic assets42. Furthermore the profitability gap is also due 
to the fact that most countries in EU carried out a massive rescue programme, while Italian 
banks received a negligible support from the governments; considering only recapitalizations, 
troubled assets purchase programs and liquidity measures, state-aid used in Italy in the context 
of the recent crises amounts to EUR 8 billion, compared to 149 billion in Germany, 114 in 
Spain, 58 in the Netherlands, 26 in France43; The size of the rescue programs implemented in 
Italy remains comparatively low also when including guarantees provided on bank liabilities. 
Furthermore, the profitability gap reflects a more conservative positioning along the risk-return 
frontier of Italian bank equity holders44, for this reason the leverage ratio plays a non-trivial 
role in explaining the lower performance of Italian banks. According to a recent study45, the 
profitability gap of Italian banks is strongly influenced by the low efficiency level for the 
operating costs, especially the labour costs; If the labour costs were in line with those of other 
European countries, the efficiency gap over the past ten years would be one third lower. Another 
factor that significantly influence the banks performance is the low level of GDP growth in 
Italy over the last decade; in the same way if the GDP growth were closing with respect to that 
of the European partners, the profitability gap would be reduced in an important way. Many 
other factors influence banks’ performances as the dividend policy, that were generous in Italy 
until a short time ago46, or the profits taxation level that were higher w.r.t the other European 
countries before it was aligned in recent time. Furthermore, the provisions have weighted on 
                                                            
42 Bank of Italy, 2009 
43 European Commission, 2015 
44 Acharya, Pierret and Steffen, 2016 
45 Bank of Italy, 2016 
46 As documented by Acharya et.al (2016) while in the euro area about 47 per cent of after-tax profits were on 
average distributed to stockholders, the share was considerably higher in Italy, where it amounted to about 67 per 
cent. 
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banks’ balance sheet; in a weak economic environment, the credit quality deteriorates, leading 
to an increase in the bad debt and in the non-performing loans (NPLs); banks must set aside a 
relevant amount of capital to hedge from the credit risk. 
The idea of this study is that Italian banks, having suffered a fall in the net-interest income, 
have tried to compensate for these losses by increasing revenue from non-interest income, as 
fees and service revenues, and from investment portfolio. The relationship between the 
portfolio investment performance and monetary policy is indirect, in fact, during the two-
financial crisis the monetary policy has supported the banking sector providing unlimited 
economic resources and alleviating market turmoil on sovereign debt securities. Traditionally 
the Italian banks held a relevant portion of the Italian sovereign debt securities, for this reason 
when the ECB stated to support the sovereign debt securities, the financial institutions were 
able to generate profits both thanks to the revaluation of assets at fair value, and thanks to the 
sale of part of the portfolios, once the securities have appreciated. 
On the April 2011, the spread between Italian 10y sovereign bonds and German 10y 
government bonds was about 120 percentage points, on July was about 225pp and in November 
it reaches the level of 575pp. Simultaneously, on December 2011 the ECB launched the first 
Long Term Refinancing Operation with maturity 36 months in order to inject long-term 
liquidity to the banking sector. It is plausible that the Italian banks bought additional Italian 
government bonds during the low-price periods and they resold the bonds after the intervention 
of the European central bank, despite the high volatility and riskiness of the Italian debt 
securities, while securities already in the portfolio, and the part not sold, registered revaluations 
in the income statement. With these manoeuvres, they generated profits in investment 
portfolios, thus we can say that monetary policy affected the banks’ investment portfolio.  
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  7.1.1. Model Data 
 
The analysis of the monetary policy effects on banks’ portfolio profitability is performed on a 
sample of 14 Italian banks, that is, the banks listed on the Italian stock exchange47 at 31st 
December 2015;  
Proceeding in the analysis the semiannual investment portfolios revenues amount of each bank 
is considered for a time window of 8 years, from 2008 to 2015. The investment portfolio data 
are extrapolated from the consolidated half-year financial statements of each financial 
institution for every year; in particular, four items feature the banks’ investment portfolios 
revenues: 
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47 Excluding Mediobanca, Fineco and Banca Finnat for their atypical business model 
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The algebraic sum of the four items identifies the net Investment Portfolio income: 
80 – Net income from trading activities + 
100/b – Profits/Losses on disposal or repurchase of: financial assets available for sale + 
110 - Profits/Losses on financial assets and liabilities designated at fair value + 
130/b – Net losses/recoveries on impairment: financial assets available for sale = 
  
Investment Portfolio income 
 
In particular48: 
 Item 80 - Net income from trading activities:  
This item, reports the algebraic sum of the balances of referred to in points a) and b): 
i. The balance between gains and losses on transactions classified under "financial 
assets held for trading" and "financial liabilities held for trading", including the 
results of evaluations of such transactions; excludes gains and losses related to 
derivative contracts linked to the fair value option, being partly under interest (items 
10 and 20) and partly in "net income from financial assets and liabilities at fair 
value" (item 110). 
ii. The balance between gains and losses on financial transactions other than those 
designated at fair value and those for hedging, in foreign currency, including results 
of measurement of such transactions. 
The results of trading and the valuation of financial assets and liabilities in foreign currency for 
cash must be kept separate from those relating to foreign exchange activities. For this purpose, 
the results of the said transactions are to be determined in the same currency of denomination, 
and converted into euro applying at: 1) the results of trading: the exchange rates used for 
accounting; 2) the results of the evaluation of the current exchange rates at the balance sheet 
date. In the case of derivatives, however, the results of evaluations and negotiations also include 
any foreign exchange differences. 
The balance referred to in subparagraph a) includes:  
                                                            
48 The following explanation has been extrapolated by the Bank of Italy circular no. 262 of 2005 – 4° update 15 
December 2015 
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1) Gains and losses from the sale of financial assets and liabilities held for trading cash; these 
gains and losses are calculated as the sum of the opening balance for the year (value of securities 
corresponding to the one entered in the budget for the previous year), the costs of purchases 
settled during the year (including the subscription of the securities in issue ), revenues from 
sales settled during the year (including the repayment of matured securities) and the final 
inventory year (a "book value", that is, before the balance sheet valuations); 
2) The results of the valuation of financial assets and financial liabilities held for trading cash; 
3) Differentials and margins, positive and negative, of the derivative contracts classified in the 
trading book, other than those relating to derivative contracts linked to the fair value option, 
due between the "interests" (ref. Items 10 and 20); 
4) The results of evaluation of derivatives classified in the trading book, other than those 
relating to derivative contracts linked to the fair value option, due to the item "Net income from 
financial assets and liabilities at fair value" (item 110); 
5) Gains and losses arising from trading in precious metals (other than gold) and the results of 
their evaluation; 
6) Conventionally gains and losses relating to derivatives, other than those of interest rates, 
embedded in hedging derivative contracts of structured financial instruments (for example, the 
implied equity-linked options in the "interest rate swaps") and the results of its evaluations; 
7) Conventionally the "reversals" in the income statement of valuation reserves of hedges of 
cash flows, when it considers that the transactions are no longer probable or when unrealized 
losses taken these reserves cannot be recovered. 
The balance referred to in point b) includes: 
1) Gains and losses arising from trading in currency and gold; 
2) The exchange rate differences, both positive and negative, relating to the assets and liabilities 
denominated in foreign currencies, other than those designated at fair value, those subject to 
fair value hedging (exchange risk or fair value) and cash flows (risk exchange) and the related 
hedging derivatives. But including the results of the measurement at fair value of forward 
currency sale and purchase of components entered into with the purpose of hedging, net of 
accrued contractual margins recorded in interest with the appropriate algebraic sign (ref. Items 
10 and 20). 
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Item 100/b - Profits/Losses on disposal or repurchase of financial assets available for 
sale: 
The sub-item b) report the balance, positive or negative, between gains and losses realized on 
the sale of "financial assets available for sale". 
about the "financial assets available for sale" gains and losses represent the balance of two 
components: an already detected in the relevant revaluation reserve (so-called "reversal" in the 
income statement of reserves); the other consists of the difference between the sale price and 
the book value of the assets sold. 
Item 110 - Profits/Losses on financial assets and liabilities designated at fair value: 
This item includes the balance, positive or negative, between gains and losses from "financial 
assets at fair value" and "Financial liabilities at fair value", including results of measurement at 
fair value of these assets and liabilities, and the results of the credit and financial derivatives 
valuations linked to the fair value option. 
Item 130/b - Net losses / recoveries on impairment financial assets available for sale: 
The sub-item b) reports the balance, positive or negative, between the value adjustments and 
write-backs related to the impairment of receivables from customers and banks of financial 
assets available for sale. 
The following graphs show the annual investment portfolio trend for each bank: 
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Graph 22 – Source: Own elaboration based on the consolidated financial statements of each bank 
 
 
Graph 23 – Source: Own elaboration based on the consolidated financial statements of each bank 
 
 
Graph 24 – Source: Own elaboration based on the consolidated financial statements of each bank 
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An interesting common factor that emerges directly from a graphical analysis is the that the 
revenues on investment portfolio for the year 2011, for some banks, recorded a sharp decline, 
while for others, especially for the Small Banks, the trend is quite constant; The only bank that 
recorded a huge increase in Investment portfolio for the year 2011 is Banco Popolare, reaching 
its relative maximum, and then suffer a sharp decline in 2012. Another common factor is the 
steadily increase in the investment portfolio revenues, for the major part of the banks present 
in the sample, starting from the biennium 2011-2012. 
The reason of the common drop in the 2011 is that many European sovereign debt securities 
faced a severe fall in prices, due to lack of confidence in the markets, resulting in increased 
volatility; The Italian banks more exposed towards the Italian government bonds recorded a 
decline in the investment portfolio; afterwards the banks preferred to direct their strategies 
toward two directions: the first increase income from commission and fees, and second to sell 
government bonds, after the ECB maneuvers, in order to get a positive margin. 
In order to compare the investment portfolio income of each bank, the total investment portfolio 
revenues are divided by the total amount of investment portfolio recorded in the same period in 
the banks’ balance sheet. The total amount of investment portfolio is extrapolated from the 
bank’s assets, in particular from the items: 20, 30, 40 of the banks’ balance sheet49. 
 
Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
10) 
20) 
30) 
40) 
50) 
60) 
… 
 … 
Financial Assets held for trading 
Financial Assets designed at fair value through profit and loss 
Financial Assets available for sale 
… 
… 
… 
 
 
 
                                                            
49 As provided by the Bank of Italy 262/2005 directive. 
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The algebraic sum of the four items identifies the total amount of Investment Portfolio: 
20 – Financial Assets held for trading + 
30 – Financial Assets designed at fair value through profit and loss + 
40 – Financial Assets available for sale + 
  
 Total Investment Portfolio amount 
 
Then the index is calculated as follow: 
Investment Portfolio income 
Total investment portfolio amount 
 
This index will represent the dependent variable in the empirical analysis described in detail in 
the next paragraph. 
The denominator is composed by the items listed above: 
 
 Item 20 – Financial Assets held for trading: 
This item includes all financial assets (debt securities, equity securities, loans, derivatives etc.) 
allocated in the trading portfolio, including expired and deteriorated derivatives. In the case of 
derivatives forming part of a compensation agreement (master netting agreement) that are 
subject to early closing (early termination), the net balance determined by the parties should be 
noted, if positive, among the credits (item 60 or 70 of the balance sheet) and, if negative, as 
liabilities (item 10 or 20 of the balance sheet liabilities). This item includes the positive balance 
of compensation made in accordance with IAS 32 paragraph 42 of the derivatives allocated to 
the trading portfolio and hedging contracts, if the absolute value of the fair value of derivatives 
allocated to the trading portfolio exceeds the absolute value of the fair value of hedging 
derivatives. This items also includes investments in companies subject to significant influence 
or joint control that the IAS 28 and IFRS 11 let to assign to this portfolio. 
 Item 30 – Financial Assets designed at fair value through profit and loss: 
This item includes all cash financial assets (debt securities, equity securities, etc.) designated at 
fair value with the effects recognized in the income statement based on the faculties given to 
companies (so-called "fair value option") IAS 39, IAS 28 and IFRS 11. 
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Item 40 – Financial Assets available for sale: 
This item includes all financial assets (debt securities, securities, capital, etc.) classified in the 
portfolio as available for sale. 
The total portfolio amount does not include the item 50 of the balance sheet: “Financial assets 
held to maturity”. The reason lies in the fact that this part of the portfolio is not used so much 
by banks; in the sample of banks considered for the analysis, about half had no financial assets 
held to maturity portfolios, and very often banks holding this portfolio, held it in a negligible 
amount. 
 
  7.1.2. Econometric Model  
 
In the light of the foregoing analysis, a quantitative model is provided, in order to study the 
impact of the monetary policy and other variables on the banks’ investment portfolio 
performance.  
 789:7;9<_>899?,A= 	BC +	BEF_10IJ8K_L8MFA +	BN$O9PL89&KQ_>899_PM<RASE+ BT∆RMJUV_P:ASE + BW∆RMJUV_P:ASN + BX$_PM<RM;Y:12[\]ASE+	B^∆7_:_R;K;R]1?,ASE + B`∆aVb_>8K?,ASE + Bc?,A"#&?,ASE+ Bc?,A∆ln	 _[PM:?,ASE + O?,A 
where: 789:7;9<_>899?,A : It represents the semiannual investment portfolio performance index for 
each bank over time. It is calculated as the total amount of investment portfolio revenues for 
each bank over time divided by the its relative amount of investment portfolio reported into the 
balance sheet; then at the numerator there is the sum of the item 80, 100/b, 110, 130/b of the 
income statement for the various years, at the denominator the sum of the investment portfolio 
items50 excluding the financial assets held to maturity. This index is reduced by the inflation 
                                                            
50 Balance sheet items: 20) Financial Assets held for trading; 30) Financial Assets designed at fair value through 
profit and loss; 40) Financial Assets available for sale; 
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recorded in Italy in the same reference period, in order to get the “real” investment portfolio 
performances. “portperf_corr” represents the investment portfolio performance, and for this 
reason it’s influenced by several variables, the aim of this study is to measure the influence of 
each variables. F_10IJ8K_L8MFA: It represents the six-months variation in the 10-year Italian Government 
Bonds yields. As we explained in the previous pages the Italian government bonds make up a 
very large part in the portfolios of Italian banks. The 10-year bond maturity were those most 
affected by the sovereign debt crisis; as shown above in 2011, these securities have fallen 
dramatically in price, resulting in an increase of the BTP-BUND spread; then, starting from 
December 2011, the price of these securities was supported by expansionary monetary policies 
of the ECB, which led to a steady rise in prices. The decrease in prices, and then the increase, 
have certainly had an impact in the investment portfolio performance of banking institutions. 
Consequently, the banking institutions should have benefited from the support of the securities 
by the ECB, either because they recorded a positive delta fair value or from the possibility of 
getting a positive margin from the sale of such securities. From this variable, we expect a 
negative relationship with the dependent variable. $O9PL89&KQ_>899_PM<RA: This variable represents the average semiannual EURIBOR value 
over time corrected by inflation. The EURIBOR (EURo Inter Bank Offered Rate) is used as the 
average rate charged by major banks for forward transactions on the interbank market (with 
counterpart other leading banks) with a maturity of one, two and three weeks, and from one to 
twelve months. The EURIBOR only varies depending on the duration of the loan and does not 
depend on the amount of capital. In this analysis, the average of a 3-months maturity EURIBOR 
is considered51; The EURIBOR rate is influenced by the monetary policy of the ECB; a low 
EURIBOR rate level mean a lower interest margin for banks; for this reason, when the rate is 
low, banks may decide to invest resources in the investment portfolio which is more 
remunerative. ∆RMJUV_P:A: Represents the semiannual variation of the Italian log GDP rate. This variable 
may influence investment portfolio; in fact, a low GDP growth rate can be translated in a low 
demand for loans by the real economy, then less interest rate revenues. A low demand for loans 
by the real economy may have a negative impact on bank’ balance sheets. Furthermore, 
generally, periods of low economic growth, associated with periods of recession, may lead to a 
                                                            
51 3-months maturity annualized, the EURIBOR expressed in the more conventional form. 
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deterioration in credit quality, further impacting the bank’ balance sheets. As in the previous 
case banks compensate the gap increasing the non-interest income, among which investment 
portfolio revenues. $_PM<RM;Y:12[\]A: indicates the expected inflation for the next 12 months on a semiannual 
basis; the idea is that in period of low expected inflation it’s logical to expect higher real 
investment portfolio performance, vice versa in period of high expected inflation. Thus, we can 
consider the expected inflation as an unexpected component; For this reason we expected a 
negative relation between the expected inflation and the dependent variable. ∆7_:_R;K;R]1?,A: Represents the semiannual difference between the TIER1 capital ratio and the 
TIER1 capital ratio of the previous period for each bank; since banks must respect rigid ratio 
imposed by Basel agreements, if the regulatory capital level doesn’t increase (then the gap 
remain stable) they cannot lend money to households and firms. Then a low level of 
patrimonalization growth may lead to an increase in investment portfolio revenues to 
compensate the impossibility to make loans. ∆aVb_>8K?,A: this variable represents semiannual delta of the Non-Performing Loans coverage 
level on banks’ balance sheet. In distressed countries as Italy, in the recent years the lending 
activity assumes greater risks for banks, then a high level of NPL coverage could be translated 
into a more revenues from interest rate because banks can assume more risks, vice versa a low 
level or NPLs coverage may influence the banks decision and may lead an increase in 
investment portfolio revenues. "#&?,A: ROA represents the biannual return on assets index for each bank. The ROA is included 
in the regression as control variable and generally it’s used to represents the banks’ management 
capacity52; in particular a high and positive ROA means a great capacity to generate profits 
from assets, then the ROA may influence the investment portfolio performance. It’s likely to 
expect a higher investment portfolio performance index from the bans with higher ROA.    ∆ln_[PM:?,A: this variable represents the half-year variation, expressed in percentage, of the net 
interest margin calculated considering only the classic bank activities, i.e. including only active 
interest from loans to customers and passive interest due to clients. With this variable we want 
                                                            
52 According to many financial Papers, the variable ROA is often used as proxy of the management ability to 
manage the assets, in the regression we took the ROA with one-time lag, to capture the managers’ ability to forecast 
and to adapt to the economic evolutions. 
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to analyze if there is a direct relation between net interest income and the portfolio performance, 
or if the relation results indirect. O?,A: It’s the error term; it represents the unobservable components of the model.  
 
It is plausible that banking institutions base their choices and strategies after observing certain 
economic indicators, such as EURIBOR or expected inflation, therefore for each explanatory 
variable, except for the 10-year Government Bond variable, a time lag of a six-months has been 
applied. In other words, it's likely that the values of an explanatory variable at time "t" influence 
the dependent variable at time "t + 1". Regarding the variable ∆RMJUV_P:, it is included in the 
regression with two-time lags as well; since Italian banks are based principally on a classical 
business model, as explained in the previous paragraphs, it’s likely that the GDP variation at 
lag two, has a relevant impact on banks’ management decisions and on banks’ portfolio 
performances as well53. 
In order to estimate the Panel data, three estimation methods were evaluated: Pooled OLS, 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects; in the next section we will explicate which of the three 
methods was used and what results has generated the model estimate. 
                                                            
53 Two model were examined, the first included only GDP with one lag, the second included both lags; we observed 
that the model with two lags were more accurate, since the GDP at lag 2 was significant at level of 1% we decided 
to include it in the regression. 
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  7.1.3. Estimation results 
 
As explained in the previous paragraphs, the dataset analyzed is an Unbalanced Panel model54, 
made up of 14 individuals observed for 16 periods; for this reason, three types of panel data 
analysis methods were considered: Pooled OLS, Fixed effects and Random Effects. 
In order to decide whether of the estimation methods it’s the most appropriate, three test were 
made:, Hausman Test, Breusch-Pagan Test and F-test. 
The first test run, is the Hausman test, in order to evaluate which model is consistent between 
Fixed effects and Random effects; below the result of the test is reported:  
Hausman Test: f0: $ >? h?,Ah?,AiE …h?,Aik = 	$ >? = 0 f1: $ >? h?,Ah?,AiE …h?,Aik ≠ 	$ >? ≠ 0 
 
 
According to the Hausman test result, the Random effects model fits better the panel data, in 
particular the GLS estimator results consistent and efficient. The high p-value suggests us to 
accept the null hypothesis that the time-invariant factor is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables.  
Then the second test done is the Breusch-Pagan test, which compare the Random effects model 
with the Pooled OLS model55: 
Breusch-Pagan test: 
 
                                                            
54 The Panel is unbalanced for the impossibility to recover data for some banks included in the sample. 
55 The Breusch-Pagan test has as null hypothesis that the variance of m? is equal to 0. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected, we can conclude that there is a significant random effects component in the dataset and the Random 
effects model fits better the heterogeneity respect to the Pooled OLS model. 
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The Breusch-Pagan test suggests us that the Pooled OLS model best fits our dataset, and the 
OLS estimator is the most efficient. The test just mentioned suggests us that in the model is not 
present heteroskedasticity, to confirm this affirmation a White’s test56 is applied to the Pooled 
OLS regression model. 
White’s test: 
 
The White’s test confirms the absence of heteroskedasticity in the model, since the p-value is 
very high we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
In order to have a further confirmation that the Pooled OLS is the best model for our case, the 
F-test is done; in the F-test the null hypothesis is that the cross-sectional units have a common 
intercept, i.e. that all _?. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected the Pooled OLS is the best 
model to use. 
F-test: 
 
The p-value is higher than 0,05, then even the F-test suggests us that the Pooled OLS is the 
best model for the type of analysis. 
 
As a result, after performing a series of tests to figure out which model did to our case, we 
decided to utilize the method of Pooled OLS. 
The instrument used for the econometric analysis of the data is the open-source software Gretl. 
In the data analysis, the software assigns to the significant explanatory variables a number of 
asterisks (from 1 to 3) which varies according to the level of significance of the estimate. In 
this analysis, it was decided to accept significance levels equal to 10% since on the base of the 
                                                            
56 The White test in the case of Pooled OLS ha sas null hypothesis the non presence of heteroscedasticity, while 
the alternative hypothesis suggests us there is heteroscedasticity 
 67 
dataset structure, we have a small group of individuals observed for a not very large number of 
periods. 
The results of the Pooled OLS estimates are reported below: 
 
 
 
 
 
It’s possible to observe immediately that the major part of the variables are significant while ∆aVb_>8K?,ASE  and ∆ln_[PM:?,ASE resulted not significant. Remember the decision to establish 
the significance level to 0.1. The significant variables are therefore: F_10IJ8K_L8MFA , 	∆RMJUV_P:ASN , $_PM<RM;Y:12[\]ASE , $O9PL89&KQ_>899_PM<RASE , ∆RMn1ASE  , ∆7_:_R;K;R]1?,A and "#&?,ASE , while the non-significant variables are ∆aVb_>8K?,A  and ∆ln_[PM:?,ASE . Focusing the attention on the significant variables, it’s 
possible to observe how the estimates seem to confirm the initial expectation.  
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In particular the results of the estimate are reported below: 
 ∆opqrs_tuuSv , 	∆opqrs_tuuSw : These two explanatory variables are resulted both 
statistically significant at 1% level. Their coefficients are both negative, this means that a 
decrease in the delta GDP ratio lead an increase in the portfolio performance; This relation is 
in line with the arguments made earlier: a low, or negative, delta GDP rate has a negative impact 
in the banks’ balance sheet, both for the contraction in the loans to non-financial sector, leading 
a decrease in the net interest income, and for the deterioration of the credit quality, with a 
consequent decreasing of the net interest income. The estimate results suggest us that the ∆RMJUV_P:ASE has a major impact on the portfolio performance, as it’s logical to expect, but 
even the ∆RMJUV_P:ASN has a relevant impact on the portfolio performance as well; thus, we 
can conclude that our supposition in which investment portfolio management decisions are 
influenced not even by the GDP level of the previous six-months but also by the GDP level yet 
the first half is confirmed by the empirical analysis. 
 x_tpyopz{uvw|}~uSv : This variable is resulted statistically significant at a level of 
1%; As supposed in the previous pages, the B was found negative, in fact it’s logical to expect 
that a decrease of the expected inflation for the next twelve months has a positive impact in the 
portfolio performance. Vice versa with an high expected inflation we may expect a low real 
portfolio performance index. 
 xÄtÅÇÄÉÑÖ_ÜÇÄÄ_tpyouSv : This variable was found statistically significant at 5% 
level with a negative coefficient; even in this case our expectation are confirmed; in particular, 
a reduction in the interbank exchange rate lead a contraction in the banks’ net interest 
profitability; banks, in order to increase profit, may decide to act on investment portfolio, 
increasing the investment portfolio revenues. This relation is confirmed by the results of the 
estimate. 
 á_vàâqÇÑ_ÅÇpáu  : The semiannual difference in the 10-year Italian Government 
Bond resulted to be statistically significant at a level of 1%. Our expectation about the influence 
on the investment portfolio performance is confirmed. The sign of the variable confirms the 
reasoning made in the preceding pages: the expansionary monetary policy, supporting the 
government bonds prices, has led to an increase in the investment portfolio performance of 
Italian banks, both because of the revaluation of these securities and the likelihood for banks to 
generate a profit by selling government bonds in the moment of greatest appreciation. 
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 ∆äãu_ozÑzo~vt,u : The delta patrimonialization level was found to be statistically 
significant at 5% level; this data confirms what said in the previous pages. The banks with 
higher patrimonialization level can assume more risks and then can lend more money to the 
non-financial sector. The estimate suggests us that a decrease in the capital ratio required level 
led an increase in the portfolio performances, since banks had to increase profits by increasing 
non-interest income. 
 åçÉt,uSv: This variable is resulted to be statistically significant at a level of 5%. In 
particular, the estimated coefficient is positive, this means that if we consider the ROA as index 
of management capacity57 to generate profits from the available assets, an increase in the ROA, 
lead an increase in the portfolio performance. This relation may be interpreted as the higher 
capacity of the management to compensate the net-interest income gap increasing the portfolio 
performance. Even this result confirms our expectation on Bc. 
 ∆ésè_ÜÇÑt,uSv : This variable, against our expectation, have resulted to be not 
significant. This means that a variation in the Non-performing loans coverage has no effects on 
the bank’s portfolio performance. Then it’s possible that the recorded variation of the variable 
could be linked to the requests made by the ECB and the will to provide stability to the bank 
title on the stock exchange, in a market situation of fragility58. Consequently, the variation in 
the non-performing loans coverage rate may not be interpreted as the will for banks to assume 
more risks, and in turn to lend more money, but in the will to guarantee stability for the banks. 
Thus, our arguments are not confirmed, and then we can conclude that the non-performing 
loans coverage ratio does not influences directly the portfolio performance.  
 ∆êë_|tput,uSv: the delta percentage of the interest margin resulted not significance; this 
means that the variation in the interest margin does not affect directly the portfolio performance, 
but it’s logical to expect that a variation in the interest margin influence indirectly the 
performance of portfolio, for example affecting the bank’s management strategies and 
decisions. 
  
                                                            
57 Net profits/ Total assets. As suggested by the Bank of Italy paper of the October 2016, in the calculation of the 
ratio, costs, provisions and taxes were included, because of their relevant influence, in the Italian environment, on 
the banks performance. 
58 Since the biennium 2013/2014 the increase in the non-performing loans rate in the banks' balance sheet has 
caused concern in the markets for the stability of some banks.  
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The synthesis of the estimates is shown below: 
Pooled OLS 
 Estimated B p-value 
const 0,0158 (0,0037) 4,28e-05 *** ∆lnGDP_it_1 -0,6363 (0,1368) 6,84e-06 *** ∆lnGDP_it_2 -0,1949 (0,0665) 0,0039 *** 
E_inflnext12mIT_1 -1,8627 (0,2794) 3,90e-10 *** 
EuriborAvg_corr_infl_1 -0,3763 (0,1634) 0,0226 ** 
d_10YGov_Bond -0,8790 (0,2250) 0,0001 *** ∆pat_leveT1_1 -0,0080 (0,0031) 0,0115 ** ∆NPL_cov_1 0,0090 (0,0066) 0,1743 
ROA_1 0,2624 (0,1315) 0,0476 ** ∆ln_mint_1 0,0008 (0,0015) 0,5946 
Standard error in parenthesis        R2 = 0,70 | F(9, 162)=42,08 
With the estimated equation: 7í;>O9ì:ì;í_>899î,A= 	0,0158	 − 0,8790		∆10YGov_BondA − 0,3763	$O9PL89&KQ_>899_PM<RASE− 0,6363	∆RMJUV_P:ASE−		0,1949	∆RMJUV_P:ASN− 1,8627	$_PM<RM;Y:12[\]ASE − 0,0080	∆7_:_R;K;R]1?,ASE+ 0,2624	"#&?,ASE + O?,A 
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 7.2. European case 
 
This part of the thesis aims to analyze how the expansionary monetary policy, undertaken by 
the ECB in recent years, influenced the portfolio performance of a group of European banks. 
In particular, will be studied whether the variables resulted relevant and significant in the Italian 
analysis had the same impact in the European scenario. First, we must remember that, as pointed 
out in chapter 6 of this thesis, there was a gap regarding the effects of the two crises in the 
European Union. On the one hand the most exposed banks to the American markets and more 
inclined to invest in financial derivative instruments, such as the German banks, were affected 
more by the financial crisis of 2008, while the more traditional banks, such as those of southern 
European countries, suffered a major impact during the sovereign debt crisis of 2010/2011. 
Regarding the determinants of bank performance, as stated previously, the decline in net interest 
income was less pronounced for the sample of European banks, while it has had a significant 
impact on European's southern banks’ balance sheets. Also, since the average level of NPLs 
was found to be lower for the European banks with respect to the Italian ones, two variables 
will be considered: the delta percentage change in the level of NPLs over the total loans and 
the delta percentage of the NPLs coverage. For this reason, the analysis will provide for some 
common variables with the analysis of the Italian case, and other variables that are better 
adapted to the European case. 
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  7.2.1. Model data 
 
For the analysis of the monetary policy effects on European banks’ portfolio, a sample of 17 
major European banks 59  is considered. In order to normalize the sample and to analyze 
comparable data, the empirical analysis will be made on data recovered by the database 
“Bankscope”. Every variable will be extrapolated by the consolidated annual data available in 
the database for a time windows of 9 years, forming a balanced panel data of 153 observations. 
As for the Italian case, the annual index of investment portfolio performance of each banks is 
considered. 
In particular, the index will be calculated as the total investment portfolio income at the 
numerator, over the total amount of the investment portfolio, recorded in the banks’ balance 
sheets, at the denominator. 
The total investment portfolio calculation is reported following: 
Income Statement 
 (Interest income loans) 
… 
… 
Net Gains/Losses on Trading and Derivatives 
Net Gains/Losses on Other securities 
Net Gains/Losses on Financial Assets a FV through Income Statement 
… 
… 
 
The algebraic sum of these three items identifies the Net investment portfolio income:  
Net Gains/Losses on Trading and Derivatives  + 
Net Gains/Losses on Other securities  + 
Net Gains/Losses on Financial Assets a FV through Income Statement  = 
Investment Portfolio income 
 
                                                            
59 The top 17 European banks for total assets at 31st December 2015, excluding three Italian banks for the 
impossibility to recover data from the database. 
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With a simply numerical analysis emerged that the investment portfolio income trend, varies 
on the basis of the banks’ “internationalization”, in facts, the banks more exposed toward the 
international markets recorded the major losses during the 2008, while the more classical banks, 
as the south-European banks, have suffered the most damages during the sovereign debt crisis, 
for then recover in the following years: 
 
 
 
Graph 25 – Source: Own elaboration based on “Bankscope” data 
 
 
 
As it’s possible to observe from the graph, two banks particularly suffered the financial crisis 
of 2007: Deutsche Bank and Crédit Agricole. In particular, the first recorded a loss of 3360 
billions on derivatives positions, while the second recorded a loss 10 billions on the assets 
evaluated at fair value. Furthermore, Crédit Agricole suffered a loss of 5 billions at the end of 
2011. 
  
                                                            
60 33 Billions of loss in the derivative positions and a Net Gains of 22 Billions in assets at Fair value, for a total 
loss of 11 Billions. 
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Then proceeding with the analysis, the total amount of the investment portfolio is extrapolated 
from the balance sheets assets of each bank: 
 
Balance Sheet 
Assets Liabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 … 
Trading Securities and at FV through Income 
Derivatives 
Available for Sale Securities 
*61… 
… 
… 
 
 
 
 
The algebraic sum of these three items provide the total amount of investment portfolio: 
 
Trading Securities and at FV through Income   + 
Derivatives  + 
Available for Sale Securities  = 
Total amount of Investment Portfolio 
 
 
Regarding the total amount of investment portfolio recorded in the banks’ balance sheets we 
observe a gap within the Eurozone. In particular Spanish, Italian and Austrian banks increased 
their total amount of portfolio in their balance sheets, while French, Belgium and German banks 
generally reduced their portfolios, but sketchily are the banks that have increased, more than 
all, the net interest income during the considered period. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
61 The item “Held to maturity securities” is not included for the same reason as the italian case. 
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 %	2007-2015	
Banco	Santander		 92,6397%	
BNP	Paribas	 -20,6157%	
BBVA	 65,9135%	
Scociètè	Gènèrale	 -4,8604%	
Credit	Agricole	 -51,4683%	
KBC		 -29,4709%	
Natixis	 -18,2113%	
Deutsche	Bank	 -23,5491%	
Commerzbank	 -31,4123%	
Erste	Bank	 25,3345%	
Banco	Sabadell	 311,3436%	
Banco	Popular	Espanol	 443,6051%	
Deutsche	PostBank	 -7,6353%	
Credit	Industriel	et	Commercial	 -71,0334%	
Raiffeisen	Zentralbank	 26,4034%	
Greek	National	Bank	 -46,8160%	
Intesa	san	paolo	 106,7196%	
Table 4 – Source: Own elaboration based on Bankscope data 
 
The table above reports the delta percentage variation in the total amount of portfolio in the 
banks’ balance sheets during the period 2007-2015; it’s possible to note the huge increase in 
the portfolios for the Spanish banks and in the Italian bank, which they doubled, and in some 
case tripled, the total amount. While, in general, Greek, French and German banks recorded a 
he reduction in their investment portfolio, reaching the relative minimum of 71% in the case of 
Crédit Industriel et Commercial. 
 
Therefore, as in the Italian case, the index of banks’ portfolio performance is calculated as 
follow: 
 
Investment Portfolio income 
Total amount of investment portfolio 
 
This index will represent the dependent variable in the empirical analysis.  
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  7.2.2. Econometric model 
 
As in the Italian case, a quantitative model is provided, in order to study the impact of the 
monetary policy and other variables on the banks’ investment portfolio performance.  
 789:_7;9<_>899?,A= 	BC +	BE∆$£J8K_§8MF_§;M>ℎA +	BN$O9PL89&KQ_>899_PM<RASE+ B¶∆RMJUV?,ASE + BTPM<R_:P8M?,ASE +	BW∆:P;9_R;K;R?,ASE+ BX∆aVb>8K;9_Q;?,ASE + B^?,A"#&?,ASE + B`?,A∆ln_n1Eß®© +		O?,A 
where: 789:_7;9<_>899?,A: It represents the annual investment portfolio performance index for each 
bank over time. This variable is the same as the Italian case, and it is calculated as the total 
amount of investment portfolio income recorded in the income statement over the total amount 
of investment portfolio recorder in the balance sheet62. As illustrated above, at the numerator 
there is the algebraic sum among the item “Net Gains/Losses on Trading and Derivatives”, “Net 
Gains/Losses on Other securities” and “Net Gains/Losses on Financial Assets at FV through 
Income Statement”. At the denominator there is the sum among “Trading Securities and at FV 
through Income”, “Derivatives”, “Available for Sale Securities”, which form the total amount 
of investment portfolio. This index is corrected for the inflation registered in the different 
European countries over time in order to get a “real” investment portfolio performance index. 
This variable represents the dependent variable in the econometric analysis. ∆$£J8K_§8MF_§;M>ℎA: This variable represents the delta percentage of the return on the 10-
year European government bonds benchmark. This benchmark is composed by a basket of 
European government bonds. The idea is that the Government Bonds, following the 
introduction of expansionary monetary policies, have seen an increase in prices resulting in 
lower yields. This index captures the aggregate effects of the central bank monetary policies on 
the Government Bonds of various European countries. As in the Italian case, we expect that a 
decrease in the benchmark index led to an increase in the investment portfolios performance 
                                                            
62 By structure, this index is influenced both by the gain/loss from the sale of assets and the revaluation/devaluation 
of assets according to the market developments. 
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held by banks, both because of the positive delta fair value recorded, and for the possibility of 
obtaining a margin by selling the securities. $O9PL89&KQ_>899_PM<RA : This variable represents the average of a 3-months maturity 
EURIBOR63 over a period of one year. Also in this case the EURIBOR is used as proxy of the 
ECB monetary policy: the reduction in the ECB key interest rate has as consequence the 
reduction in the interbank interest rate. When the interest rate is near to zero, the interest margin 
it contracted, reducing the profitability of banks. Consequently, when the EURIBOR decrease 
we may expect an increase in the portfolio performance in order to compensate the interest rate 
reduction effects and increase the net income. This variable is corrected for the average inflation 
recorder in the Eurozone over the same period. In the light of previous observations regarding 
the evolution of net interest margin for the European banks sample, we want to see if and how 
this variable has had an impact on banks' portfolio performances. ∆RMJUV?,A: This variable represents the annual variation of the log GDP rate, for each country, 
over time. Unlike the Italian case, where the delta log GDP rate was the same for the entire 
sample, in the European analysis, the delta log GDP rate will be different with respect the 
country in which the banks considered has its main headquarter. In this case we have a strong 
duality inside the European union; in fact countries where banks follow a more traditional 
business model64 sre the most affected by a contraction in the GDP level, while the countries 
with more “international” banks was less affected by a reduction in the GDL level; we have to 
underline that in general, the peripheral countries, are the countries in which banks have a more 
classical business setting and are the counties which registered the largest contraction in GDP. 
Vice versa it’s true for the countries with a more “international” banks65. Thus, in this analysis 
we want to estimate the behavior of the portfolio performance with respect the change in the 
GDL level. PM<R_:P8M?,A: This variable represents the level of expected inflation for each country for the 
next twelve months. Unlike the Italian case, the level of expected inflation change among 
countries and is not the same for the entire sample. We can consider the expected inflation as 
                                                            
63 EURIBOR (EURo Inter Bank Offered Rate) is used as the average rate charged by major banks for forward 
transactions on the interbank market (with counterpart other leading banks) with a maturity of one, two and three 
weeks, and from one to twelve months. 
64 Italy, Spain, Greece 
65 French, German, Austria 
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an unexpected component; in fact, if the expected inflation for the next 12 months is high then 
we may expect a reduction in the real portfolio performance and vice versa. It’s reasonable to 
expect a negative relation between the expected inflation and the dependent variable. ∆:P;9_R;K;R?,A: Represents the annual percentage difference between the TIER1 capital ratio 
and the TIER1 ratio of the previous year for each bank; since banks must respect rigid ratio 
imposed by Basel agreements, if the regulatory capital level doesn’t increase (then the gap 
remain stable) they cannot lend money to households and firms. Then a low level of 
patrimonalization growth may lead to an increase in investment portfolio revenues to 
compensate the impossibility to make loans. Furthermore, if the bank has to increase the level 
of TIER1 capital ratio it must employ significant resources; for this reason, we may expect a 
negative relationship between the delta TIER1 capital ratio and the dependent variable. ∆aVb>8K;9_Q;?,A: This variable represents the delta percentage of the Non-Performing loans 
coverage66 between two consecutive years. If the delta is positive, it means that there was an 
increase in the NPL coverage ratio and vice versa. The NPL coverage it’s an important factor 
for the peripheral counties, in which the NPL represents a problem for the banks’ profitability 
and stability. We observe a low level of NPL for the banks situated in Germany, France, 
Belgium and Austria, while we observe a significant level of NPL in the banks’ financial 
statement of the peripheral countries. However, the level of NPL coverage is lower on average 
in the central countries and is higher in the stressed countries. We may expect that a decrease 
in the NPL coverage leads to an increase in the portfolio performance for the same reason of 
the Italian case. "#&?,A: ROA represents the annual return on assets index for each bank. The ROA is included 
in the regression as control variable and generally it’s used to represents the banks’ management 
capacity67; in particular a high and positive ROA means a great capacity to generate profits 
from assets, then the ROA may influence the investment portfolio performance. As for the 
Italian case, it’s likely to expect a higher investment portfolio performance index from the bans 
with higher ROA.    ∆ln_n1A: It represents the annual variation of the log primary liquidity level in the Eurozone 
over time. It includes currency in circulation (circulating), and other financial assets that can 
                                                            
66 Reserves for impared loans/Impaired loans 
67 As explained in the Bank of Italy paper, October 2016 
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serve as a means of payment, such as overnight deposits, whether transferable on demand by 
check, and the traveler's checks; banknotes and coins deposited are not considered to fall in this 
aggregate, so not in circulation, in order to avoid double counting, once as banknotes and coins, 
the other as current account deposits. The monetary aggregates measure the existence supply 
of money at a particular time in the economic system; their extent influence the interest rates 
and inflation: in theory, an increased supply of money, in fact, results in a lower interest rate, 
that, in an optimal situation, mean higher loans to private sector and then higher revenues from 
active interest in the banks’ income statement. We want to study which relation had the increase 
in the money supply on the investment portfolio performances of the banking institutions. We 
expect that an increase in the money supply lead an increase in the portfolio performances for 
the same reasoning made for the EU Government Bond Benchmark.   O?,A: It’s the error term; it represents the unobservable components of the model.  
 
Since the data we have available are annual, not all the explanatory variables are regressed with 
a lag. For example, in this regression it would be useless to apply a two-time lag at the GDP 
variation as in the Italian case, because it’s unlikely that the variation of GDP at time “t-2” 
influences the portfolio performances at time “t”. While for the variables “∆ln_n1A"  and 
“∆NPL coverage” a zero-time lag was considered. The variable “∆EUGov_Bond_Bench” it’s 
included in the regression without lag, because it’s likely that the portfolios performances of 
banking institutions are influenced by the benchmark at time “t”.  
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 7.2.3. Estimation results 
 
Unlike the Italian analysis, the dataset considered for the European analysis is a balanced panel, 
made up of 17 individuals observed for 9 periods68; the methodology used to make the analysis 
is the same as the Italian one, in particular three types of panel data analysis methods were 
considered: Pooled OLS, Fixed effects (FE or WG estimator) and Random effects (RE 
estimator).  
In order to decide whether of the estimation methods it’s the most appropriate, three test were 
made: Hausman test, Breusch-Pagan test and F-test 
 
The first test run, is the Hausman test, in order to evaluate which estimator is consistent and 
efficient between Fixed effects and Random effects, the result of the test is reported below: 
Hausman test: 
The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the estimation made with the GLS methods, 
then the RE model, is consistent and efficient, while the alternative hypothesis is that the FE 
estimator is consistent and RE not consistent: 
 
According to the Hausman test result, the Random effects model fits better the panel data, then 
we accept the null hypothesis since the p-value is higher than 0,05. This result suggests us that 
the time invariant factors are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. 
Then the second test done is the Breusch-Pagan test, which compare the Random effects model 
with the Pooled OLS model69:  
 
                                                            
68 Annual data from 2007 to 2015 
69 The Breusch-Pagan test has as null hypothesis that the variance of m? is equal to 0. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected, we can conclude that there is a significant random effects component in the dataset and the Random 
effects model fits better the heterogeneity respect to the Pooled OLS model. 
 81 
Breusch-Pagan test: 
 
The Breusch-Pagan test suggests us that the pooled OLS model fits better our dataset, and the 
OLS estimator is the most efficient70. The test just mentioned suggests us that in the model is 
not affected by heterogeneity problem; in order to have a confirmation of this affirmation a 
White’s test71 is applied to the Pooled OLS regression model: 
White’s test: 
 
The White’s test confirms the absence of heteroskedasticity in the model, since the p-value is 
higher than 0,05 we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
The third test made is the F-test72, which compare the Fixed effects model with the Pooled OLS 
model: 
F-test: 
 
In this case, we observe a p-value quite low, less than 0.05, then statistically we must reject the 
null hypothesis that the Pooled OLS model is better than the Fixed effects model. However, 
from the Hausman test result we know that the RE model is better than the FE model. 
                                                            
70 Even if the p-value is not too elevated, since is greater than 0,05, statistically we must accept the null hypothesis. 
71 The White test in the case of Pooled OLS has as null hypothesis the non-presence of heteroskedasticity, while 
the alternative hypothesis suggests us there is heteroskedasticity. 
72 The F-test for the fixed effects model has as null hypothesis that the time invariant factors are identical for all 
the units. Reject the null hypothesis means that the time-invariant factors are not-null, then if we reject the null 
hypothesis we can conclude that the fixed effects model is better than Pooled OLS model. 
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As a result, after performing a series of tests to figure out which model did to our case, we 
decided to utilize the Pooled OLS method. 
As for the Italian analysis, the instrument used for the econometric analysis of the data is the 
software Gretl and the number of asterisks associated on the basis of the variable’s significance 
is the same as for the Italian analysis. Even for the European analysis we decide to accept level 
of significance equal to 10% since on the base of the dataset structure, we have a small group 
of individuals observed for a not large number of periods. 
The results of the Pooled OLS estimates re reported below: 
 
From the regression results it’s possible to observe that the major part of the variables are 
significant, while only PM<R_:P8M?,ASE	 resulted statistically not-significant. The significant 
variables are therefore: ∆ln_n1A, ∆RMJUV?,ASE, $O9PL89&KQ_>899_PM<RASE, ∆:P;9_R;K;R?,ASE, ∆aVb>8K;9_Q;?,ASE  , ∆$£J8K_§8MF_§;M>ℎA , and "#&?,ASE . Focusing on the significant 
variables, it’s possible to observe how the estimates seem to confirm the initial expectations. 
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The estimate results are reported below: 
 
 ∆op_´vu : This variable resulted to be statistically significant at 1% level. The 
coefficient is positive, then our thoughts are confirmed: an increase in the money supply leads 
to an increase in the portfolio performance. The most likely hypothesis is that the performance 
has increased both due to the increase in fair value and from the possibility to make profits by 
selling government bonds.  
 ∆opqrst,uSv:		The delta percentage of the GDP level resulted statistically significant at 
a level of 10%; this data is in line with the Italian analysis, in which the economic conditions 
of the country have an influence on the portfolio performance of the banks; in particular, the 
coefficient suggests us that a decrease in the delta GDP lead an increase in the portfolio 
performance. That’s an interesting result because from the non-statistical pre-analysis we 
observed that the even banks situated in countries which had a positive GDP growth increased 
their portfolio performance.  
 tpyoãutÇpt,uSv:	The expected inflation resulted to be not statistically significant; this 
means that an increase in the level of expected inflation for the next twelve months could not 
have an impact on the real portfolio performance. This data is in contrast with data from Italian 
analysis in which expected inflation had an important impact on portfolio performance. 
 ∆utzÄ_ozÑzot,uSv: The delta percentage variation in the level of TIER1 capital ratio 
resulted statistically significant at a level of 1%; the negative coefficient suggests us that a 
decrease in the level of capital required lead an increase in the portfolio performance; this data 
is interesting because confirm our expectation about the banks management decision in 
presence of low capital ratio; if the “patrimonialization” level doesn’t increase, cannot also 
increase loans to customers by banks; however this data is in contrast with the graph shown 
previously in which is reported the interest margin trend for the banks in the sample. We have 
to remind that the interest margin observed included also the active and passive interest from 
non-lending activities, then for the impossibility to recover more precise data we cannot observe 
the contribution to the portfolio performance of the only classical banking activities. 
 ∆ésèÜÇÑzÄãÖzt,uSv : Despite the average level of non-performing loans in the 
Eurozone is not elevated, the delta coverage of the NPLs resulted statistically significant at a 
level of 1% with a negative coefficient, we have to underline that especially for the German 
and French banks the level of NPLs coverage is not too elevate, rather it results on average 
about one half with respect to the NPLs coverage for Italian and Spanish banks. The coefficient 
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suggests us that a decrease in the NPLs coverage lead an increase in the portfolio performance; 
then our expectations have been respected; it’s interesting that for the Italian analysis the same 
variable resulted non-significant despite the high level of NPLs in the banks’ balance sheets. åçÉt,uSv: The ROA level resulted to be statistically significant at a level of 1%. The 
coefficient is positive; this result suggests us that an increase in the ROA level leads an increase 
in the portfolio performance; we can say that our expectation about the capacity of the 
management to manage the assets and to predicts market behavior seems to have a relevant 
impact on the portfolio performance73. 
 xÄtÅÇÄÉÑÖ_ÜÇÄÄ_tpyouSv : The average annual EURIBOR level corrected by 
inflation resulted to be statistically significant at a 1% level; This result is in line with Italian 
analysis. An interesting fact is that, in Europe there is a strong dualism: among the top 17 banks 
for total assets about two-thirds didn’t recorded a decrease in the interest margin. However, 
form the regression we see that the variation in the EURIBOR level had a relevant impact on 
the investment portfolio performance of the banking institutions. 
 ∆x¨qÇÑ_≠Çpá_≠zpÜÆu: this variable resulted to be statistically significant at a 10% 
level with a negative coefficient. This data suggests us that the variation in the European long-
term government bond yields had a impact on the banks’ portfolio performances. In particular 
an increase in the Government Bonds prices seem to lead an increase in the performance; 
however the coefficient is very close to zero, then we can conclude that the impact has not been 
so accentuated as in the Italian case. 
   
 
  
                                                            
73 The ROA is calculated as Net Profits/Total assets as for the Italian case 
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The synthesis of the estimates is shown below: 
 
Pooled OLS 
 Estimated B p-value 
const -0,0256 (0,0052) 3,20e-06 *** ∆lnGDP_1 -0,0984 (0,0529) 0,0652 * 
Inflation_1 -0,0490 (0,1512) 0,7464 
EurAvg_corr_infl_1 -0,4815 (0,1454) 0,0012 *** ∆tier1_level_1 -0,0181 (0,0044) 7,39e-05 *** ∆NPLcoverage -0,0208 (0,0075) 0,0066 *** 
ROA_1 0,4699 (0,1355) 0,0007 *** ∆EUGov_Bond_Bench -0,0002 (0,0001) 0,0822 * ∆ln_M1 0,2520 (0,0699) 0,0004 *** 
    Standard error in parenthesis       R2 = 0,45 | F(9, 126) = 12,86 
 
With the estimated equation: 789:_7;9<_>899?,A= 	−	0,0256	 − 0,0984	∆RMJUV?,ASE − 0,4815		$O9PL89&KQ_>899_PM<RASE− 0,0181	∆:P;9_R;K;R?,ASE −	0,0208	∆aVb>8K;9_Q;?,ASE+ 0,4699	"#&?,ASE 	− 0,0002	∆$£J8K_§8MF_§;M>ℎA 	+ 0,2520	∆ln_n1A 	+	O?,A 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
After examining what are the determinants of banks’ performance, with a particular focus on 
the determinants of the banks' proprietary portfolio, two econometric analyzes were performed, 
the first on the Italian scenario and the second on the European scenario. Interesting results 
have emerged from the analysis, some macroeconomic variables were found to be significant 
in both analyzes and with the same impact on the portfolio of individual banks, as the GDP 
behavior; also it emerged a strong duality within the Eurozone between the core countries and 
countries considered "stressed", i.e. the peripheral countries: the banks of the central countries 
such as Germany, France and Austria have suffered the worst consequences as a result of the 
financial crisis 2007 and were only marginally affected by the sovereign debt crisis of 2010. 
This is mainly due to the banks business model of those countries that is less classical than the 
peripheral countries; some banks, including Deutsche Bank, in fact, have recorded the major 
losses in the biennium 2008/2009, due to the nature of their portfolios, since there were 
significant percentages of derivative securities. Regarding the peripheral countries, some very 
important data emerged: most of the banks in these countries over the years has undergone a 
sharp decline in the net interest income, due both to the fall in the interest rates and to the lower 
lending activity to the real economy, meanwhile they recorded a significant increase in the non-
interest revenue, including those from the investment portfolio. In addition, the level of NPLs 
is most decisive for the peripheral countries than for the central countries, whereas the coverage 
level of these impaired loans is higher in stressed countries than non-stressed countries. Finally, 
the level of regulatory capital required by the Basel agreements was found to be very significant 
for all the banks involved in the Italian and European analysis. In a future work, it could be 
interesting to deepen the current European analysis by increasing the number of banks included 
in the sample and by analyzing more specifically what variables, in addition to the regular 
course of the financial markets, mostly influence the portfolio performance of European banks; 
also, it could be an interesting analysis to consider a broader time window and seeing how 
changed the performances following the outbreak of the financial crisis. 
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10. ANNEX – BANKS INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLES 
Italian analysis  
 Bank            Total assets at 31/12/2015 in € 
Unicredit 860.433.000.000  
Intesa San Paolo 676.496.000.000  
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 169.011.977.000  
Banco Popolare 120.509.595.000  
UBI Banca 117.200.765.000  
Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna 61.621.231.000  
Banco Popolare di Milano 50.203.300.000  
Credito Emiliano 37.455.301.000  
Banca Popolare di Sondrio 35.537.648.000  
Banca Carige 30.298.856.000  
Credito Valtellinese 26.901.681.000  
Banco di Sardegna 13.205.940.000  
Banca Desio e Brianza 12.248.130.000  
Banca Profilo 2.039.951.000  
 
European analysis  
 Bank          Country    Tot. ass. at 31/12/2015 in million € 
BNP Paribas FR 1.994.193 
Crédit Agricole FR 1.698.859 
Deutsche Bank DE 1.629.130 
Banco Santander  ES 1.340.260 
Scociètè Gènèrale FR 1.334.391 
BBVA ES 750.078 
Intesa san paolo IT 676.496 
Commerzbank DE 532.641 
Natixis FR 500.257 
Crédit Industriel et Commercial FR 253.976 
KBC  BE 252.356 
Banco Sabadell ES 208.628 
Erste Bank AT 199.743 
Banco Popular Espanol ES 158.650 
Deutsche PostBank DE 150.597 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank AT 138.426 
Greek National Bank GR 111.232 
 
 
